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EXAMINING DISPUTES OVER OWNERSHIP
RIGHTS TO FROZEN EMBRYOS: WILL PRIOR
CONSENT DOCUMENTS SURVIVE IF
CHALLENGED BY STATE LAW AND/OR
CONSTITUTIONAL PRINCIPLES?
Donna M. Sheinbach'
In the United States, approximately one in five couples is infertile.
Scientific advancements in reproductive technology, however, allow cou-
ples to combat problems with conception through various surrogacy ar-
rangements.2 In vitro fertilization (IVF) is one type of artificially assisted
conception procedure that creates an embryo ex utero, combining the
egg of the intended mother with the sperm of the intended father in a
petri dish.' This surrogacy arrangement allows infertile couples the
4
chance to become parents when they otherwise are unable to conceive.
*J.D. Candidate, May 2000, The Catholic University of America, Columbus School of Law
1. See Christine L. Kerian, Surrogacy: A Last Resort Alternative for Infertile Women
or a Commodification of Women's Bodies and Children?, 12 WIS. WOMEN'S L.J. 113,113
(1997) (citing HELENA RAGONIt, SURROGATE MOTHERHOOD: CONCEPTION IN THE
HEART 13 (1994)) (estimating that "two to three million couples [in America] (approxi-
mately one in five) suffer from infertility"); see also Daniel I. Steinberg, Note, Divergent
Conceptions: Procreational Rights and Disputes Over the Fate of Frozen Embryos, 7 B.U.
PUB. INT. L.J. 315, 317 (1997) (stating that "[o]ver two million couples in America are in-
fertile").
2. See Kerian, supra note 1, at 113-14 (noting that today there are various types of
surrogacy arrangements available to infertile couples, such as artificial insemination surro-
gacy, in vitro fertilization surrogacy, and donor surrogacy, but as little as fifteen years ago,
an infertile woman was limited to either adopting or accepting her infertility).
3. See id. at 114 (describing IVF, also known as gestational surrogacy or "Host
Uterus," as a procedure that creates an embryo in a laboratory environment for subse-
quent transfer to a gestational surrogate for carriage). Scientifically, the term "preem-
bryo" is a more accurate description for the fertilized entity as it exists in the early stages
of development. See CLIFFORD GROBSTEIN, SCIENCE AND THE UNBORN: CHASING
HUMAN FUTURES 58-59 (1998). Many courts and lay writers, however, do not distinguish
between the terms "embryo" and "preembryo"; therefore, this Comment uses the term
"embryo" to refer to preembryos as well, unless the precise vocabulary is necessary to dis-
tinguish the stages of embryonic development. See generally infra note 4 (defining the
preembryo in the context of the IVF procedure).
4. See Andrea Michelle Siegel, Comment, Legal Resolution to the Frozen Embryo
Dilemma, 4 OHIO N.U. J. PHARMACY & L. 43, 43 (1994) (noting that many describe the
IVF procedure as a "miracle of modern science"); see also Patricia A. Martin & Martin L.
Lagod, The Human Preembryo, the Progenitors and the State: Toward a Dynamic Theory
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Among the different types of surrogacy arrangements, IVF is unique in
that it provides infertile couples with the opportunity to create a child
who possesses their genetic makeup.5 The IVF procedure, however, is
initially "invasive and traumatic for the woman seeking implantation."6
The process usually involves numerous attempts at fertilization because
only one out of ten implanted embryos results in a successful pregnancy.7
The advent of a procedure known as cryopreservation, though, elimi-
nates the need for the woman to undergo the painful aspiration process
attendant with each attempt at conception.' Today, several eggs are ex-
tracted from the woman and fertilized during a single procedure; cryo-
preservation, or "freezing" of the embryos, maintains them for use at a
of Status, Rights, and Research Policy, 5 HIGH TECH. L.J. 257, 265 (1990) (explaining the
individual steps of the IVF procedure). The first step is for a physician to administer fer-
tility drugs to the woman in order to increase her egg, or oocyte, production. See id. Sec-
ond, the physician surgically removes the woman's ova. See id. Third, the IVF physician
fertilizes the woman's eggs with donated sperm. See id. Once the egg and sperm are com-
bined, the two cells become one, producing what is known as a "zygote." Alise R. Panitch,
Note, The Davis Dilemma: How to Prevent Battles over Frozen Preembryos, 41 CASE W.
RES. L. REV. 543, 547 (1991). The zygote then divides, and is known as a "preembryo"
because it has not reached the stage of advanced cell differentiation. See id. When the
preembryo reaches the four to eight cell stage, it can be implanted in the woman-the
fourth step in the IVF process-or frozen for use at a later date. See id.; see also Martin &
Lagod, supra, at 265. If successfully implanted, the preembryo may grow into a fetus. See
Panitch, supra, at 547; see also Clifford Grobstein, The Early Development of Human Em-
bryos, 10 J. MED. & PHIL. 213, 234-35 (1985) (discussing the stages of embryonic devel-
opment).
5. See Kerian, supra note 1, at 114 (contrasting the fact that IVF children are "bio-
logically and genetically related to their parents, the infertile couple," whereas traditional
surrogate children, conceived by artificial insemination, are not genetically related to their
parents).
6. Steinberg, supra note 1, at 317 (describing the painful injections and aspiration
procedures associated with IVF treatment).
7. See id. at 318 (adding that this figure does not take into account pregnancies that
end in miscarriage or stillbirth); see also Jennifer P. Brown, Comment, "Unwanted,
Anonymous, Biological Descendants": Mandatory Donation Laws and Laws Prohibiting
Preembryo Discard Violate the Constitutional Right to Privacy, 28 U.S.F. L. REV. 183, 189
(1993) (stating that fewer than ten percent of the 3290 attempts in 1990 to use cryopre-
served embryos in IVF achieved live births).
8. See generally Brown, supra note 7, at 188 (explaining that "[ciryopreservation is a
process that allows 'excess' preembryos fertilized during the IVF procedure to be frozen
and stored for future implantation"); see also Davis v. Davis, No. 180, 1990 WL 130807, at
*1 (Tenn. Ct. App. Sept. 13, 1990) (noting that the technique of cryopreservation is only
possible because at the eight cell stage, the nervous system, circulatory system, and pul-
monary system of the embryo are not developed yet; thus, development can be "arrested"
by "freezing" the preembryo).
9. See Brown, supra note 7, at 188-89 (stating that "[ciryopreservation both im-
proves the chances of achieving pregnancy and reduces the emotional, physical and mone-
tary costs of subsequent cycles of treatment" (footnote omitted)).
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later date.'0 This freezing technique lessens the pain and the cost of IVF
in the event that the first attempt to conceive proves unsuccessful."
Controversy over cryopreservation arises, however, when the embryos
are frozen for a period of time and unforeseen conditions necessitate a
decision regarding which donor controls the fate of their embryos. 2 For
example, if death or divorce precludes the parties from using the em-
bryos to conceive together and the donors disagree as to whether to im-
plant or dispose of the remaining embryos, the courts must decide which
donor's interests prevail. 3 If one party still wishes to become a parent
while the other does not,'4 the first issue for the courts' determination is
what law applies to embryo-ownership disputes. 5
10. See id. at 188 (explaining that once the fertilized eggs reach the four- to eight-cell
stage, they are frozen in liquid nitrogen for preservation and storage); see also Janette M.
Puskar, Note, "Prenatal Adoption": The Vatican's Proposal to the In Vitro Fertilization
Disposition Dilemma, 14 N.Y.L. SCH. J. HUM. RTS. 757, 762-63 (1998) (explaining that the
embryo culture is packaged with cryoprotectants, then placed in liquid nitrogen at a tem-
perature of minus 196 degrees Celsius, and when the woman is ready for implantation, the
process is reversed and the embryos are thawed and placed inside the woman's womb);
Robyn Shapiro, Who Owns Your Frozen Embryo? Promises and Pitfalls of Emerging Re-
productive Options, HUM. RTS., Spring 1998, at 12 (describing the process of placing a safe
number of fertilized embryos in the uterus of the woman while preserving the rest for
transfer during a woman's later cycles).
11. See Kass v. Kass, 696 N.E.2d 174, 175 (N.Y. 1998) (explaining that the cryopre-
servation process "serves to reduce both medical and physical costs because eggs do not
have to be retrieved with each attempted implantation, and delay may actually improve
the chances of pregnancy"); see also Steinberg, supra note 1, at 317-18 (recognizing the
greater "sweat equity" of the female patient with respect to the IVF procedure, but noting
that once the woman's ova are removed, neither spouse has any physical participation in
the cryopreservation process).
12. See Shapiro, supra note 10, at 12 (acknowledging that future use of cryopreserved
embryos is not usually controversial; however, in some circumstances the future disposi-
tion of embryos can involve difficult ethical, legal, and social inquiries).
13. See Kass, 696 N.E.2d at 175 (involving a dispute over the disposition of frozen
embryos as a result of the couple's divorce); AZv. BZ, Mass. Law. Wkly. No. 15-008-96, at
1 (Mass. Prob. & Fam. Ct., Suffolk County, Mar. 25, 1996) (same); Davis v. Davis, 842
S.W.2d 588, 589 (Tenn. 1992) (same).
14. See Davis, 842 S.W.2d at 589-90, 603-04 (discussing the former wife's interest in
giving the embryos a chance at life as contrasted with Mr. Davis's adamant opposition to
the implantation of the embryos in his ex-wife in light of severe bonding problems he suf-
fered as a child due to the absence of his own father, resulting from his parents' divorce).
Originally, Mary Sue Davis wanted the opportunity to implant the embyros in herself in a
"post-divorce effort" to become pregnant, but once remarried, she instead wanted the
authority to donate them to another couple. See id. at 589-90.
15. See id. at 594 (stating that "[o]ne of the fundamental issues ... is whether the
preembryos ... should be considered 'persons' or 'property' in the contemplation of the
law"). The trial court concluded that the preembryos were "human beings" and therefore
relied on a "best interest of the child" analysis. See id. The supreme court, however, de-
termined that the embryos were neither persons nor property; thus, its analysis centered
1999]
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If the courts consider the embryos to be "persons" or "unborn chil-
dren," they will use parens patriae reasoning-a "best interests of the
child" analysis based on family law principles-to decide which parent
prevails in the "custody" battle. 16 If the courts classify the jointly fertil-
ized entities as matrimonial assets, however, the court may analyze the
embryos as personal property and apply property law as if the embryos
were automobiles or jewelry." If the embryos are determined to be nei-
ther persons nor property but something in between, the applicable re-
gime is constitutional law because the issue is then whether one party's
fundamental right to procreate is more or less significant than the other
18party's right not to procreate. Lastly, if contingency agreements are
executed prior to the couple's IVF participation, the courts also must ap-
ply contract law to determine the validity of these documents. 9
on the donors' constitutional rights to procreational autonomy. See id. at 598. The issue
for the supreme court was whether the parties would become parents. See id. Had a prior
agreement existed between the parties, however, the supreme court noted expressly that
the controversy would have turned on the validity of the parties' agreement and thus the
court would have applied a contract analysis in deciding ownership. See id. at 597.
16. See id. at 594 (discussing that the trial court's decision prohibiting the destruction
of the embryos was based upon the proposition that "human life begins at the moment of
conception" (internal quotations omitted)).
17. See York v. Jones, 717 F. Supp. 421, 425 (E.D. Va. 1989). In York, a New Jersey
couple had been participating in an IVF program at a clinic in Virginia when they subse-
quently moved to California. See id. at 423. When the Virginia clinic refused to transfer
the one frozen embryo that remained from a number of unsuccessful implantation at-
tempts to their new fertility clinic in California, claiming that transfer was not an option
according to the parties' disposition agreement, the couple brought suit. See id. at 424-25.
The court in York applied an embryo-as-property theory to the dispute between the IVF
participants and their IVF clinic, treating the parties as bailor and bailee of the embryo.
See id. at 425. In fact, the court did not even discuss any possibilities other than that the
embryo was the "property" of one of the parties. See id. at 425-27. The case eventually
settled, leaving the strength of the embryo-as-property theory questionable. See id But
see Del Zio v. Presbyterian Hosp. of N.Y., No. 74 Civ. 3855, slip op. at 7-8, 11, 16
(S.D.N.Y. Nov. 14, 1978), available in 1978 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 14450 (rejecting the embyro-
as-property theory on a tortious conversion of personal property claim brought by a cou-
ple against a physician who intentionally destroyed their frozen embryo because he be-
lieved the IVF procedure was too premature to attempt with humans). The court in Del
Zio, however, did accept the couple's claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress,
awarding the woman damages of $50,000. See id. at 7-8.
18. See Davis, 842 S.W.2d at 598-601 (acknowledging that the specific freedom in dis-
pute is the fundamental right to procreational autonomy); see also supra note 15 and ac-
companying text (noting that embryo ownership disputes are analyzed in accordance with
family law if the embryos are considered persons; constitutional law if the embryos are
considered to be something in between persons and property; and contract law if there is a
prior agreement).
19. See Kass v. Kass, 696 N.E.2d 174, 180-82 (N.Y. 1998) (using contract analysis to
determine whether the parties' disposition agreement clearly expressed their intentions);
see also Davis, 842 S.W.2d at 597-98 (discussing the enforceability of a contingency agree-
ment prior to IVF participation and noting that the court would have found contract law
[Vol. 48:989
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As a result, disputes over frozen-embryo ownership depend on 1) how
courts legally classify the embryos" and 2) whether the parties executed a
prior contingency agreement." The answers to these two questions de-
termine the proper legal analysis; the applicable law determines whether
22
or not the parties involved will become parents.
Currently, no federal law exists to provide uniformity with respect to
disputes over embryo ownership23 and few states have legislation to deal
with the novel issues new reproductive technology presents." Caselaw is
fairly scarce as well, as only a few state courts have ruled on the embryo-
applicable if a valid prior agreement had existed).
20. See Bill E. Davidoff, Comment, Frozen Embryos: A Need For Thawing in the
Legislative Process, 47 S.M.U. L. REV. 131, 132 (1993) (stating that the legal status a fro-
zen embryo possesses is at the heart of embryo disposition disputes); see also GROBSTEIN,
supra note 3, at 61-64 (considering the implications of status appropriated to the unborn).
Determining status, however, forces courts to get involved in highly controversial issues
about privacy and human life. See John A. Robertson, In the Beginning: The Legal Status
of Early Embryos, 76 VA. L. REV. 437, 437 (1990) (noting that "[t]he central problem in
determining the legal status of early embryos is reconciling respect for human life and per-
sonhood with competing concerns of bodily integrity and procreative choice").
21. See supra notes 15, 19 and accompanying text (noting that the applicable law is
contract law when IVF disputes involve the existence of a prior consent agreement).
22. See Davidoff, supra note 20, at 150. Davidoff discusses the different effects of
embryo status on the enforceability of disposition agreements. See id. He states that pro-
tection of embryos as persons would presumably render embryo-disposition agreements
that called for destruction of the embryos unenforceable; however, an embryo-as-property
theory or an embryo-deserving-special-respect theory implies that "there would be few, if
any, limitations on the disposition" of the embryos. See id.
23. See Shapiro, supra note 10, at 24 (concluding that the virtual nonexistence of re-
productive regulation may be due to the "politically charged nature of the issue of assisted
human reproduction," the rate at which scientific advancement is proceeding, or the spe-
cial value placed upon the individual's right to privacy in procreative choice).
24. See generally infra Part I.D (recognizing the few states that have passed legisla-
tion with respect to the classification and disposition of embryos prior to implantation).
1999]
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ownership dilemma." As use of the procedure increases," however, the
potential for debate also will increase, promoting a need for proper guid-
ance to help in answering the moral, ethical, legal, and social policy ques-
tions that these procedures raise."
This Comment first explains how constitutional rights to privacy, pro-
creation, and parentage extend to reproductive technology techniques.
Next, this Comment examines the current statutory law pertaining to
IVF, noting that the few states that have acknowledged the controversy
do not have a uniform perspective. This Comment then analyzes the re-
cent caselaw concerning ownership rights to reproductive material by
addressing the various classifications suggested for frozen embryos and
the legality of IVF consent agreements. Lastly, although recognizing that
contract law provides a useful means of resolving disputes over embryo
disposition, this Comment argues that IVF consent agreements are es-
sentially futile if the donors' contractual intent conflicts with state law or
25. See York v. Jones, 717 F. Supp. 421, 425 (E.D. Va. 1989) (deciding that the dis-
pute over a remaining frozen embryo was a contractual dispute because the cryopreserva-
tion agreement between the parties had created a "bailment" relationship); Del Zio v.
Presbyterian Hosp. of N.Y., No. 74 Civ. 3855, slip op. at 7-8, 11, 16 (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 14,
1978), available in 1978 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 14450 (awarding IVF participants damages for
intentional infliction of emotional distress because a physician destroyed their embryo, but
rejecting the plaintiffs' conversion of property claim); Kass v. Kass, 696 N.E.2d 174, 181
(N.Y. 1998) (holding that a prior informed-consent agreement was controlling in a dispute
over cryopreserved embryos); AZ v. BZ, Mass. Law. Wkly. No. 15-008-96, at 24-25, 28
(Mass. Prob. & Fam. Ct., Suffolk County, Mar. 25, 1996) (granting a permanent injunction
against the wife to prohibit embryo implantation because the court considered the cou-
ple's situation to be drastically different from the time when they initially agreed to par-
ticipation in the IVF procedure); Davis v. Davis, 842 S.W.2d 588, 604 (Tenn. 1992)
(awarding preembryo custody to the husband in order to avoid unwanted parenthood); see
also Custody Questions: Divorcing Couple's Fight over the Fate of its Embryos Prompts
Smart Move to Take Issue out of the Courts, THE PHILADELPHIA INQUIRER, Oct. 10,
1998, at A10 [hereinafter Custody Questions] (discussing a court's recent decision ordering
the destruction of seven frozen embryos against the husband's wishes to preserve them for
possible use with another woman or for donation to an infertile couple; the case is on ap-
peal and the embryos are being stored until a decision is reached).
26. See Kevin U. Stephens, Sr., M.D., Reproductive Capacity: What Does the Embryo
Get?, 24 S.U. L. REV. 263, 265 (1997) (stating that the first IVF baby, Louise Brown, was
born on July 25, 1978 in Great Britain). Since the birth of Louise Brown, the number of
medically assisted reproduction procedures has grown substantially. See id. Today, new
procedures such as Gamete Intra-Fallopian Transfer (GIFT), Zygote Intra-Fallopian
Transfer (ZIFT), Frozen Embryo Transfer (FET), and Oocyte Donation and Surrogate
Gestational Carrier exist to aid infertile couples in their attempts at conception. See id. at
265-66.
27. See generally Larry I. Palmer, Private Commissions, Assisted Reproduction, and
Lawyering, 38 JURIMETRICS J.L. Sci. & TECH. 223 (1998) (book review) (addressing the
role legal institutions might play in resolving ethical disputes over the new ways to make
babies).
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constitutional principles.
I. EXAMINING THE FUNDAMENTAL RIGHTS OF EVERY INDIVIDUAL TO
PRIVACY, PROCREATION, AND PARENTAGE-DO THESE RIGHTS
EXTEND TO THE PETRI DISH?
Although the right to privacy is not stated explicitly in the United
States Constitution, the Supreme Court recognizes such a right in the
"penumbras" of the specific guarantees in the Bill of Rights. In addi-
tion, the Court extends the idea that every American has a fundamental
privacy right to activities relating to marriage, procreation,"' contracep-
tion,31 family relationships,32 child-rearing,33 and education.34 Indeed, the
Court maintains that traditional domestic matters generally deserve sanc-
tity from governmental intrusion; however, the Court has not hesitated
to interfere in cases where the private behavior of individuals is not what
the judiciary considers either "implicit in the concept of ordered liberty"
or "deeply rooted in this Nation's history and tradition."35
28. See Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 484-85 (1965) (interpreting the First,
Third, Fourth, Fifth and Ninth Amendments as providing a fundamental right to privacy
and holding that a law preventing married persons from using contraception is unconstitu-
tional).
29. See Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 12 (1967) (stating that the freedom to marry is
a "vital personal right[]" which is essential to every individual's pursuit of happiness).
30. See Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535, 541 (1942) (striking down as a violation
of equal protection a statute authorizing sterilization of certain categories of criminals,
reasoning that the right to procreate is "one of the basic civil rights of man" and "funda-
mental to the very existence and survival of the race").
31. See Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438, 453 (1972) (recognizing the right of unmar-
ried persons to obtain contraceptives in light of Griswold and stressing the importance of
freedom from governmental regulations regarding decisions about parenthood).
32. See Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158, 166 (1944) (initiating the idea that a
state cannot enter one's "private realm of family life," while recognizing it can regulate
some aspects of the family); see also Bellotti v. Baird, 443 U.S. 622, 634 (1979) (acknowl-
edging broad though not unlimited parental autonomy as basic to the structure of society
because moral and cultural values are passed down through the family).
33. See Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 399 (1923) (holding that the liberty interest
includes the right to raise children); see also Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510, 534-
35 (1925) (recognizing, in light of Meyer, the rights of parents to care for, nurture, and
educate children under their control).
34. See Pierce, 268 U.S. at 534-35; see also Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 213-14
(1972) (recognizing that the fundamental right of free exercise of religious belief, com-
bined with the interest of parents in the religious upbringing of their children, can in some
cases supercede a state's interest in compulsory education).
35. Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186, 190-92 (1986) (holding that there is no consti-
tutionally protected right to engage in sodomy because sexual activity, without a demon-
strated connection to marriage, family, or procreation, is not sufficient to implicate an in-
dividual's privacy interests under the Due Process Clause (citations and internal
1999]
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A. The Judicial Origins of an Individual's Rights to Privacy, Procreation,
and Parentage
The due process guarantee of liberty that the Fourteenth Amendment
provides36 supports the idea that individuals have the right to make
autonomous decisions regarding their personal and family lives.37 In the
landmark case of Roe v. Wade,3s the Supreme Court solidified a woman's
right to autonomy in procreational decisions,39 but the Court also stated
that this right was not absolute." Although the Court established as fun-
damental the right of a woman to terminate her own pregnancy,41 it also
maintained that a compelling state interest in protecting the life of the
fetus could overcome this right.
In order to determine the point at which a state's interest becomes
compelling, the Court in Roe established the trimester framework.43 The
quotations omitted)).
36. See U.S. CONsr. amend. XIV, § 1 ("No State shall make or enforce any law whichshall ... deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law.").
37. See Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 851 (1992) (recognizing that the
Fourteenth Amendment protects beliefs about one's own existence, and that matters in-
volving choices "central to personal dignity and autonomy" deserve sanctity because they
are the "most intimate and personal choices a person may make"). But see Palko v. Con-
necticut, 302 U.S. 319, 325 (1937) (qualifying the right to personal privacy as including
only rights that are "fundamental" or "implicit in the concept of ordered liberty"); see also
Bowers, 478 U.S. at 191-92 (citing with approval the language in Palko).
38. 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
39. See id. at 152-54 (holding that the implied right to privacy encompasses a
woman's qualified right to terminate her pregnancy).
40. See id. at 153-54, 164-65 (establishing that a woman's decision to terminate her
pregnancy through abortion is a fundamental right arising from the right to privacy, but
restricting the right as applicable only prior to the viability of the fetus).
41. See id. at 153-54 (discussing that the implied right to privacy is broad enough to
apply to an abortion decision); see also Board of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 572 (1972)
(declaring the breadth of the liberty provision of the Due Process Clause of the Four-
teenth Amendment). But see Casey, 505 U.S. at 951-53 (Rehnquist, J., concurring in part
and dissenting in part) (arguing, with three Justices joining, that the right to an abortion is
not a fundamental right as are the rights to marriage, procreation, and contraception, and
that the right therefore does not invoke a "strict scrutiny" analysis).
42. See Roe, 410 U.S. at 164-65 (recognizing that once the point of viability has
passed, a state can proscribe abortion in the interest of the life of the fetus, except in cases
where abortion is necessary to protect the life or health of the mother); see also Kramer v.
Union Free Sch. Dist. No. 15, 395 U.S. 621, 627 (1969) (recognizing that courts may onlyjustify limitations on "fundamental rights" (e.g., the right of qualified citizens to vote)
where there is a "compelling state interest"); Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618, 634
(1969) (same); Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398, 406 (1963) (same).
43. See Roe, 410 U.S. at 164-65. According to the trimester framework, the Court in
Roe determined that a woman was free from state regulation to seek an abortion during
the first trimester of her pregnancy. See id. at 164. During the stage subsequent to ap-
proximately the end of the first trimester, however, the state has the right to regulate the
abortion procedure if its interest is "reasonably related" to the health of the mother. Id.
[Vol. 48:989
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Court initiated the idea that the "compelling point" is at the end of the
first trimester, maintaining that state regulation is permissible if reasona-
bly related to the preservation and protection of the health of the
mother." Consequently, the woman is free to decide, in consultation
with her treating physician, whether to terminate her own pregnancy
prior to this "compelling point., 45 It is "the interests of a woman in giv-
ing of her physical and emotional self during pregnancy and the interests
that will be affected throughout her life by the birth and raising of a
child" that support a woman's right to terminate her pregnancy before
viability of the fetus.4 6 This right falls within the liberty protection provi-
sion of the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.
47
The Supreme Court again upheld the right of a woman to choose an
abortion before fetal viability in Planned Parenthood v. Casey.48 The
Court, however, qualified its decision in Roe by rejecting the rigidity of a
trimester framework that established the point at which a state's interests
became compelling in an abortion decision. 9 Instead of adhering to the
trimester framework, the Court in Casey proposed an "undue burden"
standard to evaluate state abortion restrictions imposed before fetal vi-
ability.0 Thus, the Court in Casey modified the standard by which to
For the stage subsequent to viability of the fetus, the Court determined that the state's in-
terest in the life of the fetus is sufficiently compelling to regulate, and even proscribe,
abortion, except where necessary to protect maternal life or health. See id. at 164-65.
44. See id. at 163 (providing that at approximately the end of the first trimester, state
regulation is permissible if it relates to the "qualifications of the person who is to perform
the abortion; [or] to the licensure of that person; [or] to the facility in which the procedure
is to be performed").
45. See id. at 159, 163 (explaining that there is a point in a woman's pregnancy where
her interest is "no longer sole," and at this point her right to privacy must be measured
against the state's right "to decide that ... another interest, that of health of the mother or
that of potential human life, [is] significantly involved").
46. See id. at 170 (Stewart, J., concurring).
47. See id. at 164 (striking down as unconstitutional the Texas statute which crimi-
nalized abortions except those medically necessary to protect the life of the mother).
48. 505 U.S. 833, 846 (1992) (recognizing and affirming all three parts of the holding
in Roe). First, a woman has the right to have an abortion and "to obtain it without undue
interference from the State" before fetal viability. Id. Second, the State has the power to
restrict a woman's right to an abortion after viability of the fetus, except for when an abor-
tion is necessary to protect the life or health of the mother. See id. Third, the interests of
the State in protecting the health of the woman and the life of the fetus are legitimate in-
terests. See id.
49. See id. at 876; see also Webster v. Reproductive Health Servs., 492 U.S. 490, 519
(1989) (recognizing that there does not have to be a "rigid line" designating the point of
viability after which a state may regulate but before which it may not).
50. See Casey, 505 U.S. at 876-77 (defining an "undue burden" as a "state regulation
[that] has the purpose or effect of placing a substantial obstacle in the path of a woman
seeking an abortion of a nonviable fetus").
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judge a state's interest in protecting a potential life, but it did not disturb
Roe's essential holding that a state's power begins at viability."
The Court previously had emphasized the fundamental rights of an
individual to privacy, procreation, and parentage in Stanley v. Illinois.2
The Court in Stanley stated that "[t]he rights to conceive and to raise
one's children have been deemed 'essential,' 'basic civil rights' . . . and
'[r]ights far more precious than property rights."'53 This distinction, that
rights involving parenthood carry more weight than rights to personal
property, is precisely the reasoning that governs states' decisions re-
garding ownership rights to frozen embryos.54
B. Examining the Constitutional Privacy Rights Negatively -A State
Court Suggests that the Rights Not To Procreate and Not To Become a
Parent Are More Significant than the Rights To Procreate and To Become
a Parent
In 1992, the Tennessee Supreme Court, in Davis v. Davis,55 confronted
a marital dispute over the disposition of seven cryopreserved embryos.56
In Davis, the parties attempted unsuccessfully for years to conceive
through the help of IVF.57 Frustrated, the couple divorced, leaving the
51. See id. at 846, 876; cf. David Stoller, Prenatal Genetic Screening: The Enigma of
Selective Abortion, 12 J.L. & HEALTH 121, 135 (1998) (arguing that the Court's reasoning
in Roe and Casey allows an abortion based upon pre-natal genetic screening results be-
cause these tests can be performed far in advance of the point of viability of the fetus).
52. 405 U.S. 645 (1972).
53. Id. at 651 (citations omitted); see also Kerian, supra note 1, at 120-21 (discussing
the fundamental right of parents to "bear [and] beget" children, unless a compelling state
interest justifies intervention).
54. See infra Part I.B (explaining that state courts prefer embryo disposal over im-
plantation due to the importance of an individual's right to avoid forced parenthood); see
also Kerian, supra note 1, at 121-22 (discussing the contention that the right to privacy in-
cludes a fundamental right to procreate including procreation through surrogacy or other
medically available options).
55. 842 S.W.2d 588 (Tenn. 1992).
56. See id. at 589. The parties in Davis were able to agree on all aspects of the disso-
lution of their marriage, except for the ownership of seven frozen embryos. See id. Mary
Sue Davis originally brought suit for the purpose of gaining control over the embryos with
the hopes of conceiving a child after her divorce. See id. The trial court awarded her cus-
tody of the embryos to afford her the "opportunity to bring [them] to term through im-
plantation." Id. (internal quotations omitted). The court of appeals, however, reversed,
concluding that Junior Davis, Mary Sue's ex-husband, had a "constitutionally protected
right not to beget a child where no pregnancy has taken place." Id. (internal quotations
omitted).
57. See id. at 591-92 (detailing the woman's attempts to become pregnant). Prior to
the couple's attempts to use IVF, Mary Sue Davis had five extremely painful tubal preg-
nancies resulting in the ligation of both of her fallopian tubes. See id. at 591. After en-
countering problems with adoption, IVF was the Davises' only remaining option. See id.
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issue of ownership over their stored, fertilized embryos as the source of
much debate.58 The issue in Davis concerned the appropriate legal char-
acterization of the embryos because the wife viewed the embryos as po-
tential human beings whereas the husband viewed the embryos as mari-
tal property. 9
The court in Davis analyzed each of the parties' arguments and con-
cluded that cryopreserved embryos were neither "persons" as the wife
61
claimed ° nor "property" as the husband suggested. Instead, the court
initiated the idea that the embryos were something more than simply
human tissue but less than complete persons and, therefore, deserved
"special respect. 6 2 The court's interim classification awarded the em-
Mrs. Davis unsuccessfully underwent the IVF procedure six times at a total cost of $35,000
before the advent of cryopreservation. See id. Once their clinic offered cryopreservation
as an option, Mary Sue Davis opted to try the freezing technique to avoid further painful
aspiration procedures. See id. at 592. The couple's seventh attempt at IVF provided nine
ova for fertilization; seven of which were fertilized and frozen for subsequent conception
attempts. See id.
58. See id. (noting that there was no indication that the parties ever considered what
would become of their remaining embryos and that the clinic never discussed with the
couple what would happen to their embryos in the event of any unforeseen events, such as
divorce). There is sharp division over how to handle unimplanted embryos. Compare
Puskar, supra note 10, at 776-80 (discussing the Vatican's plan for the "pre-natal adop-
tion" of frozen embryos in order to bring unwanted embryos to term), with Brown, supra
note 7, at 236-37 (concluding that regulations that prohibit preembryo discard violate the
donors' right to procreative liberty and are unconstitutional absent a compelling state in-
terest).
59. See Davis, 842 S.W.2d at 593-94, 598 (noting the discussion on the record regard-
ing the proper descriptive terminology to use, because denotation of a four- to eight-celled
entity as a "child" would define the embryo's legal status differently than if it were re-
ferred to as a "preembryo"). Mary Sue Davis characterized the embryos originally as
"human beings" and won at the trial court level with the argument that "human life begins
at the moment of conception." Id. at 594 & n.16. Before the Supreme Court of Tennessee
heard the case, however, Mrs. Davis changed her position and characterized the embryos
as "potential life" instead of "human beings." See id. at 594 n.16. Junior Davis did not
explicitly call the embryos "property," but he referred to them as "two or eight cell tiny
lumps of complex protein" in his brief. See id. at 598. The court of appeals, ruling in favor
of Mr. Davis, also did not state that the embryos were "property," but it held that the par-
ties shared an "interest" in the embryos, indicating that it believed them to be more like
property than persons. See id. at 595-96. The court of appeals also relied on York v.
Jones, 717 F. Supp. 421, 424-25 (E.D. Va. 1989), which reasoned that an embryo was
"property" for the purpose of deciding a dispute over ownership. See id. at 596.
60. See Davis, 842 S.W.2d at 594-97 (rejecting the trial court's analysis that the em-
bryos were "children in vitro" and, therefore, deserved to be born, rather than destroyed);
cf. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 158, 162 (1973) (concluding that the Fourteenth Amend-
ment's use of the word "person" does not include the unborn, and that "the unborn have
never been recognized in the law as persons in the whole sense").
61. See Davis, 842 S.W.2d at 595-97 (rejecting the court of appeals' characterization
of the embryos as mere property).
62. See id. at 596-97 (contemplating the "person" versus "property" dichotomy based
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bryos more respect than property, but less respect than that accorded to
living beings, because although the embryo represented more than a
mere collection of cell tissue, its status as a human was still only "poten-
tial."63
Thus, the court in Davis rejected both an embryo-as-person and em-
bryo-as-property analysis of this issue, and instead balanced the interests
of the parties based upon their individual constitutional rights to have or,
alternatively, not to have children. 4 The court maintained that without
the benefit of a prior consent agreement indicating the parties' intentions
at the time they agreed to IVF participation, the interests of the party de-
siring to avoid genetic parenthood were more significant than the burden
imposed on the procreational autonomy of the other donor.6' As a re-
sult, the court in Davis refused to allow either implantation or adoption
of the seven embryos, and instead, awarded the embryos to the fertility
clinic to dispose of in accordance with its normal procedure.66
C. Prior Consent Agreements Provide Individuals with the Opportunity
to Outline Their Personal Interests in Procreation or in Avoiding
Procreation Prospectively
The court in Davis recognized that the existence of a prior agreement
upon the three categorizations presented by the American Fertility Society). The Society
suggests three ethical positions in the debate over embryo status: 1) that embryos be af-
forded the same rights as people; 2) that embryos are no different from human tissue; or 3)
that the embryo occupies an "intermediate position," somewhere between persons and
tissue due to both their potential for life and the symbolic meaning of a preembryo for
many people. See id. at 596; see also Ethics Committee of the American Fertility Society,
53 FERTILITY AND STERILITY supp 2, 34S-35S (1990) [hereinafter American Fertility So-
ciety's June 1990 Report] (articulating the different views in the embryo status debate).
63. See Davis, 842 S.W.2d at 596-97 (concluding that the preembryos are entitled to
special respect in accordance with the American Fertility Society's June 1990 Report); see
also American Fertility Society's June 1990 Report, supra note 62, at 34S-35S (recognizing
that the "special respect" classification is the most widely accepted view in the preembryo
status debate).
64. See id. at 603-04 (placing Junior Davis's right to avoid procreation above Mary
Sue's right to engage in procreation because it agreed with Junior's testimony that
"[d]onation, if a child came of it, would rob him twice-his procreational autonomy would
be defeated and his relationship with his offspring would be prohibited").
65. See id. (describing the court's attempt to balance the interests of the parties).
66. See id. at 605. The court's ruling awarded the embryos to the couple's fertility
clinic; however, the court was not aware that the clinic's "normal procedure" was to do-
nate any surplus embryos to a childless couple. See Davis v. Davis, No. 34, 1992 WL
341632, at *1 (Tenn. Nov. 23, 1992) (per curiam). Because this result was exactly what the
court rejected when it ruled in Junior's favor, it subsequently remanded the case for fur-
ther proceedings. See id. at *2. The issue to decide on remand was whether to donate the
embryos for approved research, which would require the consent of both parties, or to
otherwise discard them. See id.
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might have eliminated the need to analyze the characterization of the
embryos in deciding the ownership dispute.67 The court did not have the
benefit of a prior agreement, though, because the parties did not execute
one before participating in the IVF procedure. 68 The New York Court of
Appeals in Kass v. Kass 69 did have the benefit of a prior consent docu-
ment when it confronted a similar issue.70 Like Davis, the issue in Kass
was whether implantation would be permitted where one of the parties
to IVF subsequently objected to the use of the frozen embryos for pur-S 71
poses of conception.
In Kass, the couple underwent nine unsuccessful attempts in three
years to have a child through IVF, but only their final IVF procedure in-
. 71
volved cryopreservaton. Consequently, prior to the last of their IVF
attempts, the clinic required that the parties sign a consent document re-
garding disposition of the embryos before they could begin the egg re-
trieval process.73 The document that both parties signed gave the IVF
clinic permission to examine, for biological studies, any embryos that re-
mained from their IVF participation and to dispose of them for approved
research investigation if the parties no longer wished to initiate a preg-
nancy or were unable to make an independent decision as to disposi-
74tion.
67. See Davis, 842 S.W.2d at 590 (noting that two critical factors were missing that
potentially could have influenced the outcome of the litigation: 1) the existence of a writ-
ten agreement regarding disposition of the embryos; and 2) statutory law governing dispo-
sition).
68. See id. at 592 & n.9 (noting that there was no agreement because "the clinic was
in the process of moving its location [and] ... it was impossible to postpone the procedure
until the appropriate forms were located").
69. 696 N.E.2d 174 (N.Y. 1998).
70. See id. at 179 (indicating that the issue over which party had authority over the
embryos was answered by the parties' original consent agreement; therefore, the court did
not address whether the embryos were entitled to "special respect" as suggested by
Davis).
71. See id. at 175.
72. See id. at 175-76. The wife went through the egg-retrieval procedure five times
and went through nine implantations. See id.
73. See id. at 176-77 (explaining the provisions of each of the consent forms signed by
both parties with respect to disposition of any remaining fertilized embryos).
74. See id. On May 12, 1993, the couple gave their IVF physician permission to re-
trieve as many eggs as medically possible by signing Addendum No. 1-1 to the clinic's
General Informed Consent Form No. 1. See id. at 176. Their agreement to allow more
eggs than necessary to be retrieved during one aspiration required the parties to sign the
"Additional Consent Form for Cryopreservation [Informed Consent Form No. 2]." Id.
The first part of the Informed Consent Form No. 2 provided that the parties decide how to
dispose of the pre-zygotes in the event of any unforeseen conditions. See id. The couple
indicated that: 1) the excess eggs were to be inseminated and cryopreserved for possible
1999] 1001
Catholic University Law Review
Relying on the Davis court's acknowledgment that if a prior agreement
existed, it would have been presumed valid and controlling,75 the Kass
court maintained that the existence of the parties' consent document
controlled the dispute over their frozen embryos." In order to determine
whether the signed agreement indicated the original intentions of the
parties, the court in Kass applied the principles of contract law. 7 Be-
cause a tangible document existed to indicate the donors' intent at the
time of their participation in the IVF procedure, the court did not have
to address the issue of whether the embryos were entitled to special re-
781spect. Ultimately, the court in Kass held that the parties' consent
document was a valid and binding contractual agreement that clearly and
unequivocally expressed the couple's intent to donate the embryos for
research purposes in the event that the parties were unable to come to an
agreement on how to dispose of them.79
D. The Variations of Statutory Law with Respect to the Classification and
Disposition of Frozen Embryos Prior to Implantation
Currently, only six states have initiated specific legislation attempting
to resolve the problems associated with IVF. ° The extent to which each
use by them during a future IVF cycle; and 2) "[iJn the event that we no longer wish to ini-
tiate a pregnancy or are unable to make a decision regarding the disposition ... [o]ur fro-
zen pre-zygotes may be examined by the IVF Program for biological studies and be dis-
posed of by the IVF Program for approved research investigation .... " Id. at 176-77.
75. See Davis v. Davis, 842 S.W.2d 588, 597-98 (Tenn. 1992) (discussing the enforce-
ability of a prior contingency agreement and concluding that "an agreement regarding dis-
position of any untransferred preembryos in the event of contingencies (such as the death
of one or more of the parties, divorce, financial reversals, or abandonment of the pro-
gram) should be presumed valid and should be enforced as between the progenitors").
76. See Kass, 696 N.E.2d at 178-79 (recognizing that, based on its reading of Davis,
"any prior written agreement .. . should be presumed valid, and implemented," lest courts
balance the competing interests of the gamete providers).
77. See id. at 180-81. Mrs. Kass claimed the consent forms were "fraught with ambi-
guity" regarding the disposition of the embryos; hence, they did not express clearly the
intentions of the parties. See id. at 180. Mr. Kass maintained that the consent forms were
clear, and "plainly mandate[d] transfer to the IVF program." Id.
78. See id. at 179.
79. See id. at 182; cf. Johnson v. Calvert, 851 P.2d 776, 782 (Cal. 1993) (en banc) (sup-
porting the validity of a gestational surrogacy contract after the host mother objected to
relinquishing the baby). The court in Johnson examined the document in order to deter-
mine the intent of the parties and found that the document clearly expressed the parties'
intent to use the surrogate only for the purpose of facilitating procreation. See id. There-
fore, the court awarded custody to the parents who originally intended to bring the child
into being. See id.
80. The states are Florida, Kansas, Kentucky, Louisiana, New Hampshire, and Penn-
sylvania. See FLA. STAT. ch. 742.17 (1993) (prescribing disposal methods and establishing
inheritance rights); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 65-6702 (1992) (allowing for disposition without
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of these states has set guidelines varies greatly." Furthermore, the states
do not categorize the embryos within the interim classification structure
82that the Davis court suggested.
state interference); KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 311.715 (Michie 1995) (prohibiting use of
public funds for IVF research or procedures); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 9:122-33 (West
1991) (detailing legal status, ownership, inheritance rights, etc. of human embryos); N.H.
REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 168-B:13-15 (1994 & Supp. 1996) (defining eligibility, limiting donors,
and restricting usage of preembryos); PA. STAT. ANN. §§ 3213(e), 3216(c) (West 1983 &
Supp. 1998) (outlining IVF reporting requirements). Colorado and New York touch upon
the issue of parental rights with respect to artificial insemination. See COLO. REV. STAT. §
19-4-106 (1998) (establishing paternity for the non-donor husband); N.Y. DOM. REL. LAW
§§ 73, 123-24 (McKinney 1988 & Supp. 1999) (establishing legitimacy of child born
through artificial insemination, barring fees for surrogacy contracts, and declaring irrele-
vant a woman's participation in a surrogate contract for disputes over parental rights).
Illinois, Massachusetts, and Michigan allude to the consequences of disposition and ex-
perimental research of embryos, outside the context of IVF, but do not address the prob-
lematic issues specifically associated with IVF. See 720 ILL. COMP. STAT. 510/6 (West
1996) (stating that IVF is outside the scope of prohibitions against fetal experimentation);
MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 112, § 12J(a) (1996) (prohibiting experimentation on human fe-
tuses, but without mentioning IVF); MICH. COMP. LAWS § 333.2685 (1979) (same). Vir-
ginia also briefly mentions IVF, but only addresses the procedure with respect to its re-
quirement that all gamete donors be tested for HIV. See VA. CODE ANN. § 32.1-45.3
(Michie 1997). Also, Virginia requires that the IVF patient execute a disclosure form, but
only requires that this form address the HIV testing procedure used to ensure that the do-
nor is not infected with the HIV virus and that the form explain the success rate of the
procedure with respect to the age of the female IVF participant. See id. § 54.1-2971.1
(1998). For examples of states that have mentioned IVF in their laws, but only for the
purpose of including or excluding the practice of IVF for insurance purposes, see ARK.
CODE ANN. §§ 23-85-137, 23-86-118 (Michie 1992) (mandating that expenses for IVF are
covered by disability insurance companies); CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 1374.55
(West 1990) (excluding IVF from infertility treatment coverage); CAL. INS. CODE §
10119.6 (West 1993) (same); CONN. GEN. STAT. § 38a-536 (1993) (offering coverage for
the diagnosis and treatment of infertility, including IVF procedures); HAW. REV. STAT. §
432:1-604 (1993) (providing insurance coverage for IVF, but only as a one-time benefit);
215 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/356m (West 1996) (providing coverage for IVF if the "individual
has been unable to attain or sustain a successful pregnancy through reasonable, less costly
medically appropriate infertility treatments"); TEX. INS. CODE ANN. § 3.51-6(3A)(d)
(West Supp. 1999) (providing the same benefits for IVF as other pregnancy-related proce-
dures).
81. Compare LA. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 9:123, 129 (affording frozen embryos the same
status as biological human beings and consequently making intentional destruction unlaw-
ful), with KAN. STAT. ANN. § 65-6702 (providing that embryo disposition is lawful), and
N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 168-B:13, 168-B:21 (stating that IVF is only available to donors
who, among other requirements, receive counseling and obtain judicial preauthorization
of all required written consent agreements).
82. See supra Part I.B (discussing the Davis case). An issue for the court in Davis was
whether the embryos were "persons" or "property." See Davis v. Davis, 842 S.W.2d 588,
594-97 (Tenn. 1992). The court decided, however, that it could not classify the embryos as
either "persons" or "property" because the embryos did not fit neatly into either category.
See id. at 597. The court's rationale was that the embryos deserved less respect than per-
sons, but more respect than property. See id. Therefore, the court created a third classifi-
cation-an "interim category"-and awarded the embryos "special respect." See id. The
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1. One State's Classification of Embryos as Persons Legislatively
Imposes Their Right to Life
Interestingly, the state with the most comprehensive measures to
regulate IVF is the state that maintains the most controversial position.83
Although many of the judicial decisions regarding the disposition of fro-
zen embryos conform to the Davis interpretation-that the embryos do
not deserve the respect afforded persons because they may never realize
their biologic potential"-the Louisiana statute states explicitly that
"[an in vitro fertilized human ovum exists as a juridical person., 85 Lou-
isiana maintains that, as people, the embryos are separate entities with
the legal capacity to sue or be sued.86 With respect to ownership of the
"human embryo[s]," Louisiana asserts that a fertilized embryo is a
"biological human being" that is not the donor's property.
88
As might be expected from Louisiana's characterization of the em-
bryos as human beings, the statute expressly punishes the intentional de-
struction of the embryos.89 Thus, the ovum must be made available for
states that have passed legislation regarding IVF, nevertheless, do not classify the embryos
uniformly in this "interim category"; some equate them with persons, others with property
(i.e., human tissue). Compare LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 9:126 (defining "[a]n in vitro fertil-
ized human ovum [as] a biological human being"), with N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 168-B:1
(1994) (defining a preembryo as a "cell mass that results from fertilization of an ovum
prior to implantation").
83. See LA. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 9:123-33 (maintaining that embryos that result from
the IVF procedure are "juridical person[s]" and deserve rights approximating those of
human beings).
84. See Davis, 842 S.W.2d at 596 (detailing the American Fertility Society's "inter-
mediate" approach which suggests affording embryos "'special respect' because they are
neither persons nor property); see also Kass, 696 N.E.2d at 179 (concluding that the pre-
zygotes were not "'persons' for constitutional purposes"); AZ v. BZ, Mass. Law. Wkly.
No. 15-008-96, at 19 (Mass. Prob. & Fam. Ct., Suffolk County, Mar. 25, 1996) (adopting
the Davis court's "'special status' approach"). But see York v. Jones, 717 F. Supp. 421,
426-27 (E.D. Va. 1989) ("recognizing the plaintiff's proprietary rights in the pre-zygote").
85. LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 9:123.
86. See id. §§ 9:124-125.
87. Id. §§ 9:121 (defining a human embryo as "an in vitro fertilized human ovum,
with certain rights granted by law, composed of one or more living human cells and human
genetic material so unified and organized that it will develop in utero into an unborn
child"). The state of Louisiana classifies the capacity, legal status, separate entity, owner-
ship, responsibility, qualifications, destruction, duties of donors, judicial standard, liability,
and inheritance rights of the in vitro fertilized human ovum under the Chapter 3 heading,
"Human Embryos." See id. §§ 9:123-33.
88. See id. § 9:126 (allowing patients' rights as parents to be preserved if their identity
is expressed and, if no identity is expressed, the physician is deemed a temporary guardian
of the ovum until implantation can occur).
89. See id. § 9:129. Louisiana provides that the in vitro fertilized human ovum de-
serves separate recognition from the medical facility or clinic that stores it, yet the physi-
cian or medical facility that performs the IVF procedure is responsible directly for the
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adoptive implantation if the IVF patients renounce their parental rights.9
Employing the principles of family law, Louisiana examines the "best in-
terests of the child" to resolve disputes that arise between the parties re-
garding their IVF embryos.91 Louisiana places great emphasis on the fact
that, although the IVF patients do not own the embryos, they still owe
them a "high duty of care and prudent administration."92
2. Examining the States that Provide Legislative Guidance for Donors
and Medical Facilities By Requiring a Contractual Agreement
Regarding Disposition Prior to IVF Participation
Although Louisiana's legislative focus is on protecting the lives of the
embryos, other states concentrate their legislative efforts on the repro-
ductive decisions of the donors.9' Florida law, in particular, requires a
written agreement similar to the one relied on in Kass, whereby the
commissioning couple and the treating physician provide for the disposi-
ovum's safekeeping. See LA. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 9:125, 127. At least one commentator
finds Louisiana's solution to be short-sighted and potentially a source of more problems
than it purports to solve. See Stephens, supra note 26, at 268-69 (questioning Louisiana's
law punishing the intentional destruction of frozen embryos, due to the potential for the
embryos to exist for years or even decades after the death of the donors who provided the
eggs and sperm that created them).
90. See LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 9:130; see also Puskar, supra note 10, at 776-80
(quoting a member of the Catholic Church who called the destruction of frozen embryos
"'prenatal slaughter,' where 'tens of thousands of innocent lives will be legally cut short"'
and highlighting the Vatican's proposal that married women volunteer to bring unwanted
embryos to term (internal quotations omitted)). The Church's suggestion, that frozen em-
bryos should be brought to term by married women, should not be interpreted as an im-
plicit approval of the IVF process by the Church; it is staunchly opposed to the IVF pro-
cedure. See id. at 778.
91. See LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 9:131 (stating that "[i]n disputes arising between any
parties regarding the in vitro fertilized ovum, the judicial standard for resolving such dis-
putes is to be in the best interest of the in vitro fertilized ovum").
92. Id. § 9:130. If the couple does not want the embryos, then they may renounce
their parental rights and make the embryos available for adoption, but they may not re-
ceive any compensation for such renunciation. See id.
93. See COLO. REV. STAT. § 19-4-106 (1998) (addressing parental responsibilities and
custody rights of artificial insemination donors); N.Y. DOM. REL. LAW § 73, 123-24
(McKinney 1988 & Supp. 1999) (same). The states of Colorado and New York provide
that in cases where a married woman is artificially inseminated with semen donated by a
man not her husband, that the husband, not the semen donor, is the natural father of a
conceived child. See COLO. REV. STAT. § 19-4-106; N.Y. DOM. REL. LAW § 73 (McKin-
ney 1988); see also McDonald v. McDonald, 608 N.Y.S.2d 477, 480 (App. Div. 1994)
(holding that in cases where a woman gives birth to a child formed from the egg of another
woman, but intends to raise the child as her own, the birth mother is the natural mother
for custody purposes). Thus, by statute and judicial interpretation, New York extinguishes
the parental rights of sperm/egg donors when these individuals do not have an intent to
raise the child that results from a successful implantation. See N.Y. DOM. REL. LAW § 73;
McDonald, 608 N.Y.S.2d at 480.
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tion of any eggs, sperm, or embryos in the event of death, divorce, or an
unforeseen circumstance. 94 In addition, Florida law provides for the
resolution of similar disputes in the absence of a prior written agree-
ment.95 By prescribing a prior written agreement, Florida forces IVF pa-
tients to consider specifically how they wish to dispose of any resulting
embryos before attempting to conceive through IVF.96
Similarly, New Hampshire requires a prior agreement from IVF par-
ticipants; however, New Hampshire further requires judicial preauthori-
zation for any proposed surrogacy arrangement. 97 New Hampshire at-
tempts to ensure that donors are well informed with respect to the IVF
process by statutorily outlining the requirements necessary to participate
in IVF and insisting that each donor receive counseling prior to the em-
bryo transfer procedure. 98 Under New Hampshire's surrogacy law, the
wife and husband, if the woman is married, must indicate in a written
agreement their acceptance of the legal rights and responsibilities of par-
enthood for any children that result from their participation in IVF.9
3. States Are at Odds as to Whether Disposition Should Be Lawful or
Unlawful
There is sharp disagreement among the states regarding the legal dis-
position of cryopreserved embryos.' ° As mentioned above, Louisiana
law provides that destruction of the embryos is unlawful because it con-
94. See FLA. STAT. ch. 742.17 (1997) (determining rights of inheritance and parentage
with respect to the disposition of eggs, sperm and preembryos).
95. See id. (stating that, absent a written agreement, there are three options: 1) if the
eggs and sperm are not yet fertilized, each party retains ownership of his/her own material;
2) if fertilization has taken place, the couple has joint decisionmaking authority; and 3) if
one of the donors has died, the survivor retains control of any eggs, sperm, or preem-
bryos).
96. See id.
97. See N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 168-B:21 (1994) (stating that the parties to IVF must
jointly petition the court for judicial preauthorization of the surrogacy arrangement in or-
der to participate in IVF or embryo transfer to a surrogate).
98. See id. § 168-B:13 (1994 & Supp. 1996) (listing the requirements for eligibility to
participate in the IVF procedure).
99. See id. § 168-B:13(IV)(c) (1994). The language of the statute seems to suggest
that if the woman is not married, but otherwise meets the statutory requirements, her non-
marital partner does not need to receive consultation. See id.
100. Compare KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 311.715 (Michie 1995) (allowing a public medi-
cal facility to perform IVF procedures "as long as such procedures do not result in the in-
tentional destruction of a human embryo"), and LA. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 123, 129 (West
1991), with FLA. STAT. ch. 742.17 (1997) (requiring a written agreement detailing embryo
disposition and providing a procedure in the absence of such agreement), and KAN. STAT.
ANN. § 65-6702 (1992) (maintaining that embryo disposition is lawful).
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siders the embryos to be biological persons. 1 In contrast, Florida main-
tains that disposition is lawful, but requires that the commissioning cou-
ple jointly agree on disposition.102
Although the New Hampshire statute does not address disposition
specifically, it mentions donation for research purposes, implying that
experimentation on embryos-which presumably would result in even-
tual disposal-is permissible.03 Kansas statutes agree with Florida stat-
utes that disposition is lawful when jointly decided by the donors,' 4 but
Kentucky maintains that a public medical facility's intentional destruc-
tion of an embryo is unlawful. 05 Thus, it is evident that the "person" ver-
sus "property" characterization of embryos is not determinative in the
dispute over disposition versus implantation because some states clearly
consider disposition unlawful even though they do not classify the em-
bryos as living persons.""
II. AN ANALYSIS OF THE SOLUTIONS PROPOSED BY THE COURTS THAT
HAVE ADDRESSED CONTROVERSY OVER CRYOPRESERVED ENTITIES
State courts apply a generally uniform analytical method to controver-
sies over entities stored in cryobanks for the purpose of future implanta-
tion. Although the courts recognize that the embryos possibly have the
ability to grow into human beings, they nonetheless place the interests of
the progenitors above the interests of the potential lives.08 The courts
101. See LA. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 123, 129.
102. See FLA. STAT. ch. 742.17 (requiring that the commissioning couple provide for
the disposition of any eggs, sperm, or embryos in a prior written agreement, or absent a
written agreement, decide upon it jointly).
103. See N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 168-B:15 (1994) (stating that embryo transfer is un-
lawful once research is performed upon an embryo).
104. See KAN. STAT. ANN. § 65-6702 (prohibiting the state or any political subdivision
of the state from prescribing the "use of any drug or device that inhibits or prevents ovula-
tion, fertilization or implantation of an embryo and disposition of the product of in vitro
fertilization prior to implantation" (partial emphasis added)).
105. See KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 311.715 (prohibiting the use of public funds for abor-
tion or in vitro fertilization and prohibiting use of public medical facilities for intentional
destruction of embryos).
106. See FLA. STAT. ch. 742.17 (allowing frozen embryos to be disposed of only if the
couple agrees to it jointly; however, not defining embryos as "property"); KY. REV. STAT.
ANN. § 311.715 (denying the option of disposition if public funds or facilities are involved,
even though the embryos are not classified as human beings).
107. See Kass v. Kass, 696 N.E.2d 174, 182 (N.Y. 1998) (ruling in favor of the party
that argued against implantation of the embryos); AZ v. BZ, Mass. Law. Wkly. No. 15-
008-96, at 28 (Mass. Prob. & Fain. Ct., Suffolk County, Mar. 25, 1996) (same); Davis v.
Davis, 842 S.W.2d 588, 604 (Tenn. 1992) (same).
108. See supra note 107 and accompanying text (discussing state court decisions or-
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focus their judicial inquiry on balancing the interests of the parties, and
mandate that the real issue involving embryo ownership is whether the
parties desire to become parents. °9 The court in Davis suggested that in
the absence of a contingency agreement providing guidance, courts must
use a fact-specific analysis to decide which partner prevails in an embryo-
ownership dispute. "' Ultimately, the courts look to the burden that
forced parenthood would impose upon the objecting party to determine
whether his/her burden outweighs the other party's interest in procrea-
tion. " '
A. Sensitivity Precludes a Bright-Line Rule: Seven Suggestions to Resolve
the Dilemma over Frozen Embryo Ownership
The court in Davis acknowledged that a bright-line rule with respect to
the frozen-embryo-ownership dilemma would dispose of these disputes
"in a clear and predictable manner."".2 The court, however, refused to
elect an unconditional rule in part due to the "ethical considerations that
have developed in response to... scientific knowledge."'"3
The court in Davis noted that according to various medical-legal schol-
ars and ethicists, there are seven possible models for the disposition of
frozen embryos:". 1) to donate all embryos that the gamete-providers do
not use;"5 2) to discard all embryos that the gamete-providers do not
dering the destruction of embryos).
109. See, e.g., Davis, 842 S.W.2d at 598.
110. See id. at 603-04 (looking to the burden each party would bear if judgment were
entered against them).
111. See id. at 604 (explaining that imposing the burden of forced parenthood upon the
objecting party outweighs the other party's interest in procreation); AZ v. BZ, Mass. Law.
Wkly. No. 15-008-96, at 28 (Mass. Prob. & Fam. Ct., Suffolk County, Mar. 25, 1996)
(same).
112. Davis, 842 S.W.2d at 590-91 (recognizing "the virtue of ease of application" if
only the court would adopt one of the options various medical-legal scholars and ethicists
have proposed regarding cryopreserved embryos).
113. Davis, 842 S.W.2d at 591 (deciding that the moral, ethical, and legal considera-
tions that accompany such a delicate issue require a case-by-case analysis rather than a
bright-line rule); see also Siegel, supra note 4, at 43 (underscoring the complexity of a
bright-line test for frozen embryo ownership due to the significant controversy and intense
emotion that accompany this issue).
114. See Davis, 842 S.W.2d at 590-91 (commenting on the absence of a written agree-
ment, statutory law, and caselaw that would otherwise govern or guide the court regarding
the issue of disposition; therefore, looking to the comments and analysis contained in vari-
ous legal journals to guide its reasoning). Recently, the New York State Task Force on
Life and the Law articulated a possible eighth disposition model suggesting that "no em-
bryo should be implanted, destroyed or used in research over the objection of an individ-
ual with decision-making authority." See Kass v. Kass, 696 N.E.2d 174,179 (N.Y. 1998).
115. See Davis, 842 S.W.2d at 590 & n.3 (citing Colleen M. Browne & Brian J. Hynes,
Note, The Legal Status of Frozen Embryos: Analysis and Proposed Guidelines for a Uni-
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use;" 6 3) to vest control of the embryos solely with the female provider;"
4) to allow the IVF clinic to control the embryos in the event of an im-
passe;"' 5) to infer that the parties have "made an irrevocable commit-
ment to reproduction [that] would require transfer either to the female
provider or to a donee"; ' 19 6) to divide the remaining embryos equally be-
tween the parties;"" or 7) to give "veto power to the party wishing to
avoid parenthood., 121 Indeed, the Tennessee Supreme Court recognized
the utility of choosing one of these options as a uniform means of re-
solving future disputes; however, it concluded that the issue required a
fact-specific inquiry in every case in order to be fair to the parties in-
volved.
122
Therefore, the court in Davis held that the first step in deciding con-
troversies over embryo disposition is to consider "the preferences of the
progenitors.' 23  If the donors' wishes conflict or are unascertainable,
then any prior agreement regarding disposition controls.24 In the event
that there is no prior agreement, a court must weigh the relative interests
form Law, 17 J. LEGIS. 97, 117-19 (1990)).
116. See id. at 590.
117. See id. at 590 & n.4 (describing the "sweat-equity" model as entitling the female
to control over the embryos due to "her greater physical and emotional contribution to the
IVF process") (citing John A. Robertson, Resolving Disputes Over Frozen Embryos, 19
HASTINGS CENTER REP., Nov./Dec. 1989, at 7, 7-8 (rejecting this approach)); cf. Lori B.
Andrews, The Legal Status of the Embryo, 32 LOYOLA L. REV. 357, 404 (1986) (com-
menting on an alternative model that vests control with the female only when she wishes
to use the embryos herself).
118. See Davis, 842 S.W.2d at 590-91 (describing one of the two "implied contract"
models).
119. Id. (describing the second of the two "implied contract" models); see also Tanya
Feliciano, Note, Davis v. Davis: What About Future Disputes?, 26 CONN. L. REV. 305, 344-
46, 348 (1993) (asserting that an implied contract model is the most equitable approach for
determining the disposition of unused frozen embryos); Mario J. Trespalacios, Comment,
Frozen Embryos: Towards an Equitable Solution, 46 U. MIAMI L. REV. 803, 828-29 (1992)
(same).
120. See Davis, 842 S.W.2d at 591 & n.6 (describing one of the two "so-called 'equity
models' as being the "worst of both worlds" because neither gamete-provider would be
satisfied with the result).
121. Id. at 591.
122. See id. at 590-91. In arriving at the conclusion that none of the proposed models
was sufficient to establish a defined rule, the court recognized
that given the relevant principles of constitutional law, the existing public policy
of Tennessee with regard to unborn life, the current state of scientific knowledge
giving rise to the emerging reproductive technologies, and the ethical considera-
tions that have developed in response to that scientific knowledge, there can be
no easy answer.
Id.
123. Id. at 604.
124. See id.
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of each donor.12 ' For this inquiry, the court elected a variation of the
seventh model which, as suggested, gave the objecting party the power to
veto use of the embryos for purposes of conception. The court in Davis
concluded that in weighing the relative interests of the parties in disputes
over frozen embryo ownership, the donor wishing to avoid procreation
ordinarily should prevail over the donor who desires to conceive."'
B. An Examination of the Person Versus Property Dichotomy
In Davis, the lower courts split regarding the issue of whether the em-
bryos were persons or property. 18 The trial court determined that the
embryos were human at the moment of conception and thus deserved a
chance at life. 9 The court of appeals, however, recognized "that 'the
parties share[d] an interest' in the embryos and treated them more like
marital property. As a consequence of the appellate court's failure to
define this "interest" more specifically, the Supreme Court of Tennessee
decided to address the proper characterization of frozen embryos. 3'
An argument for awarding rights approximating those of human be-
ings to four- to eight-celled embryos is that these embryos are already
fertilized at the time that they are preserved.12 Therefore, scientifically,
125. See id.
126. See id. at 591, 604. The seventh suggestion the court considered in Davis was to
give an automatic "veto power to the party wishing to avoid parenthood, whether it be the
female or the male progenitor." Id. at 591.
127. See id. at 604 (emphasizing that this "rule does not contemplate the creation of an
automatic veto" (emphasis added)).
128. See id. at 589, 595-96.
129. See id. at 589.
130. See id. at 595-96 (citing the court of appeals' decision). While the court of appeals
did not explicitly refer to the embryos as property, it recognized the parties' joint interest
in the seven frozen entities. See id. The court did not further define this interest. See id.
The court relied, however, on York v. Jones, 717 F. Supp. 421 (E.D. Va. 1989), in its analy-
sis. See id. The dispute in York involved the transfer of a single frozen embryo from one
fertility clinic to another. See York, 717 F. Supp. at 422. The court in York determined
that the issue was a property matter because the cryopreservation agreement created a
bailment relationship between the participants and their IVF clinic. See id. at 425; see also
supra note 17 and accompanying text (discussing York and the embryo-as-property the-
ory).
131. See Davis, 842 S.W.2d at 589-90, 596. The Supreme Court of Tennessee stated
that the court of appeals' reliance on the York case, as well as its failure to define further
the nature of the interest the Davis's shared in their embryos, implied that the parties'
joint interest was a property interest. See id. Therefore, the supreme court concluded that
it was important to address the appropriate legal status of the embryos "[f]or purposes of
clarity in future cases." Id.
132. See id. at 593. The court examined the scientific testimony Mary Sue Davis used
to support a right to life argument at the trial. See id. For example, the court heard testi-
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frozen embryos have a unique genetic identity133 and the potential for
life.14 In contrast to this argument, the embryos, though fertilized, have
not developed to the point where they can be considered autonomous
when they are cryopreserved for future implantation.' This opposite
argument, therefore, begs the result that embryos cannot be counted or
given the same rights as sovereign members of a state because they more
closely resemble items of property while they are stored stagnantly in
liquid nitrogen containers."'
The Davis court determined that the embryos were neither persons
nor property, but instead occupied an "interim category," deserving of
"special respect. '' 117 The special respect classification the court imple-
mented afforded the embryos more rights than human tissue, but less
rights than actual living beings. 38
mony by the French geneticist, Dr. Jerome Lejeune, who referred to the embryos "as
'early human beings,' as 'tiny persons,' and as his 'kin."' See id. Dr. Lejeune testified that
"he was deeply moved that... 'the mother, want[ed] to rescue babies from this concentra-
tion can'). See id. But see id. at 593-94 (considering the testimony of Ms. Davis's gyne-
cologist who countered the geneticist's testimony by emphasizing that the accepted term
for a zygote is "preembryo" up until 14 days after fertilization; the American Fertility So-
ciety supports this position).
133. See American Fertility Society's June 1990 Report, supra note 62, at 34S (recog-
nizing that "the preembryo is a living, genetically unique entity with a statistical potential
to implant, if exposed to a receptive uterus, and to be delivered as a newborn infant").
But see Martin & Lagod, supra note 4, at 276 (proposing that "[t]he preembryo may have a
unique genetic identity but it lacks the more developed 'cluster of features' which we asso-
ciate with persons"); Siegel, supra note 4, at 44 (same).
134. See Brown, supra note 7, at 187 (explaining that those embryos that have been
fertilized and that have properly divided into four cells, can be transferred into the
woman's uterus). One commentator has said that "[wlithin two to three days [after trans-
fer], the embryo implants itself into the wall of the uterus and a pregnancy may be de-
tected in approximately fourteen days" (footnote omitted). See id. But see Richard A.
McCormick, S.J., Who or What Is the Preembryo?, 1 KENNEDY INST. ETHICS J. 1, 3-4
(1991) (concluding that "developmental individuality or singleness" is established only
once the attachment to the uterine wall is completed).
135. See American Fertility Society's June 1990 Report, supra note 62, at 31S (stating
that "at the 8-cell stage, the developmental singleness of one person has not yet been es-
tablished"); see also id. at 31S-32S (concluding that zygote development is only potential
because psysiologically, cellular differentiation does not begin until the preembryo inter-
acts with the mother, and statistically, only one in three will accomplish this naturally).
136. See Martin & Lagod, supra note 4, at 271, 287; see also Siegel, supra note 4, at 48
(recognizing the state's controversial argument that a "best interests of the child" rationale
should apply even though an embryo cannot be considered a legal member of the body
politic).
137. Davis, 842 S.W.2d at 597; see also supra notes 59-62 and accompanying text (dis-
cussing the court's analysis regarding whether the embryos should be classified as persons,
property, or deserving of "special respect").
138. See id. at 596-97. But see Robert A. Destro, Is Roe v. Wade Obsolete?, 24 HUM.
LIFE REV. 55, 64-66 (1998) (criticizing the court's contractual resolution in Kass that
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In awarding the embryos less respect than if they were considered hu-
mans, the Tennessee court's rationale complied with the Supreme
Court's reasoning in Roe v. Wade139 and Planned Parenthood v. Casey.140
The Supreme Court in Roe afforded women the constitutional right to
terminate their pregnancies without state interference prior to viability of
the fetuses in part because the fetuses were not capable of surviving on
their own before this point.4 1 Similarly, the court in Davis reasoned that
"if the state's interests do not become sufficiently compelling in the abor-
tion context until the end of the first trimester, after very significant de-
velopmental stages have passed, then surely there is no state interest in
these preembryos which could suffice to overcome the interests of the
gamete-providers."'42  The court gave paramount importance to the
"dramatic change" pregnancy brings to the lives of the donors and con-
cluded that the issues that forced maternity or paternity present super-
cede a potential child's right to life.44 Thus, the potential lives of the
embryos are "not sufficient to justify any infringement upon the freedom
of these individuals to make their own decisions.' '4 4 By using this analy-
sis, at least in the context of IVF, state courts can consider the donors'
interests first and, therefore, dispense with trying to classify the preem-
bryos conclusively as either persons or property.
treated embryos as "chattel" and analyzing this classification in the context of the Thir-
teenth Amendment's prohibition of slavery).
139. 410 U.S. 113, 162 (1973) (noting that "the unborn have never been recognized in
the law as persons in the whole sense"); Davis, 842 S.W.2d at 595, 601 (referencing Roe v.
Wade).
140. 505 U.S. 833, 870-71 (1992) (maintaining that the state's interest in fetal life is not
enough to justify a legislative ban on nontherapeutic abortions before the point of viabil-
ity); see also Webster v. Reproductive Health Servs., 492 U.S. 490, 529 (1989) (O'Connor,
J., concurring) (noting that "viability remains the 'critical point"'); Thornburgh v. Ameri-
can College of Obstetricians & Gynecologists, 476 U.S. 747, 779 n.8 (1986) (Stevens, J.,
concurring) ("No member of this Court has ever suggested that a fetus is a 'person' within
the meaning of the Fourteenth Amendment."), overruled by Planned Parenthood v. Ca-
sey, 505 U.S. 833 (1992).
141. See Roe, 410 U.S. at 162-63 (reasoning that the state's interest in protecting the
potential life of the fetus becomes compelling at viability because it is at this point that the
fetus "has the capability of meaningful life outside the mother's womb"); see also Casey,
505 U.S. at 870 (defining viability as "the time at which there is a realistic possibility of
maintaining and nourishing a life outside the womb").
142. Davis, 842 S.W.2d at 602 (footnote omitted).
143. See id. at 603 & n.28 (acknowledging the haunting feelings of regret and concern,
associated with the birth of a child, that occur when genetic parents do not have contact
with their children).
144. Id. at 602.
145. See Kass v. Kass, 696 N.E.2d 174, 179 (N.Y. 1998) (deciding to ignore whether the
embryos are entitled to special respect and instead concentrate on the interests of the par-
ties as evidenced by their prior consent agreement); Davis, 842 S.W.2d at 604 (establishing
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C. Balancing the Interests of the Parties Without the Benefit of a Prior
Consent Document: Courts Prevent Procreation When One Party Objects
In analyzing disputes over disposition, the court in Davis suggested
that the first step is to consider the interests of the involved parties.'46 In
Davis, though, the court did not have the benefit of a prior consent
agreement to look to in determining what the interests of the progenitors147
were. Without a prior agreement, the court was forced to intervene toS • 1481
decide what was best for the IVF participants. In its conclusion, the
Davis court initiated the idea that "the party wishing to avoid procrea-
tion [ordinarily should] prevail.'
149
In evaluating the interests of the progenitors, the Tennessee Supreme
Court recognized that IVF does not concern interference with a woman's
bodily integrity, as does an abortion decision. The controversy over
whether to implant or dispose of the preembryos occurs before the clinic
implants the entities into the woman's womb; thus, the fetus is not actu-
ally growing inside the woman's body when the decision to carry or dis-
pose of the potential life is made.5 Therefore, unlike abortion, the fe-
male IVF participant does not have greater decision-making power over
the male participant with respect to whether to implant or dispose of the
frozen embryos.' With IVF, the burden imposed on the woman is no
greater than the burden imposed on a man; that is, neither has commit-
ted yet to the pregnancy; therefore, neither party has greater decision-
that the donors' interests be considered first in disputes regarding embryo disposition).
146. See Davis, 842 S.W.2d at 604 (summarizing the steps to take in resolving frozen
embryo ownership disputes).
147. See id. at 590 (noting also that there was no Tennessee statute or caselaw ad-
dressing the disposition of frozen embryos so the court turned to medical and legal jour-
nals for guidance on this issue).
148. See id. at 590, 602-04 (choosing disposal over implantation due to the objection of
Mr. Davis to becoming a parent, explaining that the state's interest in potential life is not
substantial enough to allow encroachment upon a donor's procreational rights).
149. Id. at 604 (summarizing the court's holding). In arriving at this conclusion, the
court discussed the novel issue presented by genetic parenthood-that "someone un-
known to these parties could gestate these preembryos ... [and] that these parties, the
gamete-providers, would become parents in that event, at least in the genetic sense." Id.
at 603.
150. See id. at 601.
151. See id. at 602 (noting that even after implantation it is questionable whether these
embryos will ever result in a successful pregnancy); cf. Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505
U.S. 833, 852 (1992) (explaining that it is the woman's unique liberty interest in her bodily
integrity that entitles her to have an abortion free from the state's interference before vi-
ability).
152. See Davis, 842 S.W.2d at 601; cf. Planned Parenthood v. Danforth, 428 U.S. 52, 71
(1976) (stating that the woman is "more directly and immediately affected by the preg-
nancy" because it is she "who physically bears the child").
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making authority. ' Thus, the court in Davis maintained that concerns
that have previously precluded men from controlling abortion decisions
are not applicable to disputes over ownership rights to cyropreserved
embryos.' -"4
D. Focusing on the Interests of the Progenitors When Expressed. By Prior
Consent Agreements
Whereas the court in Davis did not have the benefit of a prior consent
agreement to determine the interests of the progenitors, the Court of
Appeals of New York in Kass did have the couple's prior agreement,
which expressed their intent at the time of their participation in the pro-
cedure.' The only issue in Kass, therefore, was whether the couple's
prior agreement was sufficiently clear to control disposition. '56
The parties in Kass agreed to divorce barely three weeks after signing
the hospital's IVF consent forms. 5 7 Shortly thereafter, Mrs. Kass in-
formed her physician that she changed her mind regarding the consent
instructions allowing for the destruction or release of the embryos.'58
One month later, she requested sole custody of the embryos to attempt
another implantation.9 As a result of this request, her husband sought
specific performance of their initial consent agreement that vested con-
trol of the embryos with the IVF facility for purposes of research. '6°
153. See Davis, 842 S.W.2d at 601. But see Olya Thompson, Embryos and Rights:
Ethical Complications Abound in World of Assisted Reproduction, THE PHILADELPHIA
INQUIRER, Oct. 15, 1998, at A23. In a recent New Jersey case regarding ownership rights
to frozen embryos, the attorney for the woman remarked that a woman has more of an
investment in the IVF procedure because she will carry the fetus. See id. Therefore,
"[wihat is in the petri dish is not an equal donation." See id.
154. See Davis, 842 S.W.2d at 601 (noting, however, that the IVF process has a more
severe emotional and physical impact on a woman than on a man).
155. See Kass v. Kass, 696 N.E.2d 174, 180 (N.Y. 1998) (noting that the IVF facility
provided the consent documents, but neither party challenged the legality of the docu-
ments for not expressing their own intent).
156. See id. at 177-78, 180 (discussing the appellate division split over whether the con-
sent agreement was ambiguous). The appellant claimed that the documents were "fraught
with ambiguity"; however, the respondent urged the court to give the documents a literal
interpretation and to mandate transfer to the IVF program. See id. at 180-81.
157. See id. at 176-77 (explaining that the parties signed four consent forms on May 12,
1993 prior to their final IVF procedure, and then agreed to dissolve their marriage on June
7, 1993). The couple had finalized their divorce by the time their case reached the court of
appeals. See id. at 175.
158. See id. at 177 (indicating that Maureen Kass wrote a letter to the hospital and her
physician expressing her opposition to the disposition instructions).
159. See id.
160. See id.
1014 [Vol. 48:989
Examining Disputes over Ownership Rights
In its attempt to discern whether the consent documents reflected the
true intentions of the parties, the court in Kass analyzed the issue in ac-
cordance with common law principles governing contract interpreta-
tion.16' Thus, the court examined the document as a whole and consid-
ered the parties' circumstances at the time they executed the contract.
In its analysis regarding the clarity of the agreement, the court focused
on the couple's "[w]ords of shared understanding-'we,' 'us' and
'our' , ' 163 and concluded that the evidence indicated that both parties de-
sired disposition to be their joint decision. 64 Therefore, the court in Kass
held that the prior consent document was sufficiently clear to indicate the
parties' intentions and, consequently, ordered donation of the embryos
to the IVF program for approved research pursuant to the agreement.
In Hecht v. Superior Court,116 the Court of Appeals of California con-
fronted an analogous situation; however, the dispositional inquiry con-
cerned only a man's sperm, as opposed to a fertilized entity as in Davis
and Kass.'67 Nevertheless, the court similarly attempted to discern the
true intentions of the donor in examining the issue of whether the do-
nor's wife or his adult children controlled possession of his frozen
168
sperm.
In Hecht, a man donated his sperm to a sperm bank for preservation
with the hope that his wife would decide to have his child after his
death. '69 A few weeks after depositing fifteen vials of sperm at the sperm
161. See id. at 180-81.
162. See id. (stating that traditional contract interpretation dictates that "[plarticular
words should be considered, not as if isolated from the context, but in the light of the obli-
gation as a whole and the intention of the parties as manifested thereby" in deciding
whether an agreement is ambiguous).
163. Id. at 181.
164. See id. (stating that "[t]he overriding choice of these parties could not be
plainer").
165. See id. at 182.
166. 59 Cal. Rptr. 2d 222 (Ct. App. 1996).
167. See Hecht, 59 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 223; Kass, 696 N.E.2d at 175 (dealing with cryopre-
served embryos); Davis v. Davis, 842 S.W.2d 588, 591 (Tenn. 1992) (same).
168. See Hecht, 59 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 223-25 (noting that the decedent clearly intended to
donate his sperm to his wife for the purposes of conception). The issue before the court,
however, was whether his intent to donate his sperm superceded a property agreement to
distribute his "assets" after his death). See id. at 225.
169. See id. at 223-24 (acknowledging decedent's intent to give his frozen sperm to his
wife, as evidenced in 1) the signed sperm bank donation form, 2) his will, which specifi-
cally bequeathed his sperm to his wife for the purpose of conceiving his child even after his
death, and 3) a letter addressed to his children expressing his desire for his wife to have
another child using his sperm).
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bank, the man committed suicide. 70 Yet despite his specific instructions
to give his sperm vials to his wife for the purpose of procreation, as evi-
denced by his sperm bank donation form and his will, the executor of his
171
estate refused to give the wife possession of the fifteen vials of sperm.
When the executor requested instructions from the court, the superior
court judge ordered all of the vials destroyed, but the court of appeals
reversed and remanded the decision. On remand, another judge de-
cided to treat the sperm as part of the wife's property settlement, and
awarded her custody of three of decedent's fifteen vials, explaining that
because the wife was entitled to twenty percent of her husband's assets
according to the estate settlement, she was also entitled to twenty per-
cent of his sperm. 3
The court of appeals' final decision stated that the decedent's sperm
was not subject to the terms of the parties' property settlement agree-
ment because sperm is "unique material.', 74 The court did not apply
property law to the dispute, explaining that the same rules do not apply
with respect to disposition of human reproductive material as they do to
specie or land.7 5 The court concluded instead that the fundamental right
to conceive must be "jealously protected," and awarded the sperm to the
widow in light of the decedent's unequivocally expressed intent to pro-
create.176 The Kass and Hecht decisions reflect the benefit of prior con-
sent agreements in determining the interests of the donors of reproduc-
tive material.
77
170. See id. at 224 (explaining that over a period of one month, the man made six trips
to the cryobank to deposit his sperm, then, a few weeks later on a trip to Las Vegas, lost
$20,000 and thereafter committed suicide).
171. See id. at 223-24.
172. See id. at 224.
173. See id. (stating that the property settlement arose because the decedent's two
adult children challenged his will). The parties eventually signed a "global settlement"
providing that the decedent's wife would "receive 20 percent of the estate's residual 'as-
sets."' Id.
174. Id. at 226 (explaining that genetic material "is a unique form of 'property' [and
thus,] is not subject to division through an agreement among ... beneficiaries which is in-
consistent with the decedent's manifest intent").
175. See id. (recognizing that "[a] man's sperm or a woman's ova or a couple's em-
bryos are not the same as a quarter of land, a cache of cash, or a favorite limousine").
176. See id. at 226-27 (stating that there was no ambiguity regarding the decedent's
intent; therefore, it should be honored); see also E. Donald Shapiro & Benedene Sonnen-
blick, The Widow and the Sperm: The Law of Post-Mortem Insemination, 1 J.L. &
HEALTH 229, 232 (1986-87) (noting a court's characterization of sperm as "the seed of
life"; therefore, determining that the donor should dictate its fate).
177. See Hecht, 59 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 227 (relying on decedent's donation form, will, and
letter because these documents unambiguously indicated his intent); Kass v. Kass, 696
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III. SEARCHING FOR A REASONABLE MEASURE To PREVENT
UNWANTED CHILDREN WHILE SALVAGING LAST-CHANCE EFFORTS AT
PARENTHOOD: A COMMENT ON THE UTILITY OF PRIOR CONSENT
DOCUMENTS
The issue regarding whether to implant or discard leftover frozen em-
bryos lies in the difficulty in weighing the individual rights of the pro-
spective mother and father against the interest in preserving unborn
lives.'7 8 In determining whether embryos are human beings or human tis-
sue, some believe that embryos are not persons due to the possibility that
they may never realize their biologic potential.'7 9 On the other hand,
others believe that the fact that the embryos are fertilized before they are
frozen weakens the argument for merely treating them as chattel.80 It is
apparent that people have different viewpoints regarding the proper
categorization of frozen embryos.'8'
To overcome this divergence of views, donors may rely on consent
agreements; a method for indicating how they wish to dispose of extra
embryos remaining from their IVF attempts.'82 For example, donors who
N.E.2d 174, 180 (N.Y. 1998) (noting that the benefit to prior consent agreements lies in the
participant's knowledge beforehand that they are enforceable).
178. Cf. Custody Questions, supra note 25, at A10 (recognizing the most recent battle
over frozen embryo custody in New Jersey as the third judicial dispute to confront "the
conflict of rights among prospective mothers, fathers and children").
179. See Davis v. Davis, 842 S.W.2d 588, 595 n.19 (Tenn. 1992). In its analysis of
whether the embryos were persons or property, the court noted that embryos transferred
from a petri dish to a host mother have only a 13-21 percent chance of achieving actual
implantation. See id. The court then compared the poorer chance of pregnancy attempted
with the use of a surrogate with the excellent chance of pregnancy to result in a live birth
given a viable fetus left undisturbed in the mother's uterus and brought to term. See id.
180. See Destro, supra note 138, at 55 (understanding Kass as treating the unborn as
property because the court determined that contract law decided the issue).
181. See Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 160-61 (1973). The Court in Roe discussed the
strong support for the belief that birth is the beginning of life, but it also recognized that
the Catholic Church believes that life begins at the moment of conception. See id. In ad-
dition, the Court recognized that new medical technologies such as the "morning-after"
pill, artificial insemination, IVF, and artificial wombs present further problems regarding
how to classify embryos due to the difficulty in establishing a precise definition as to when
life begins. See id. at 161.
In Davis, the Tennessee Supreme Court rejected a geneticist's testimony that embryos
are "tiny human beings," explaining that his interpretation "revealed a profound confu-
sion between science and religion." Davis, 842 S.W.2d at 593. The Vatican, however, re-
cently issued a proposal calling for "prenatal adoption" of unwanted embryos, based on its
belief that the embryos are human and deserve a chance at life. See Puskar, supra note 10,
at 776-780. The Vatican's proposal purports to give all fertilized embryos a chance at sur-
vival, despite the fact that the Catholic Church does not condone the IVF procedure. See
id.
182. See Kass, 696 N.E.2d at 180 ("Advance directives, subject to mutual change of
mind that must be jointly expressed, both minimize misunderstandings and maximize pro-
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view their embryos more like marital property than persons can indicate
their desire to donate them for research purposes or simply discard them,
pursuant to a jointly signed consent document.' Alternatively, donors
who consider the embryos to be more like people than property can indi-
cate, in a prior agreement, that they wish to give their embryos a chance
for survival by allowing the female donee to attempt her own pregnancy,
or by allowing for adoptive implantation by a willing surrogate.'9 The
problem with these agreements, however, is twofold: 1) they indicate the
donors' intent at the time they began the procedure, which may change
over time;'85 and 2) state law or constitutional principles may overturn
some prior agreements.'86
Contractual intent to dispose of the embryos in the event of disagree-
ment is futile if state law prohibits the intentional destruction of frozen
embryos." 7 Similarly, if one of the donors decides that s/he does not wish
to become a parent, subsequent to signing a prior consent directive that
allows any excess embryos to be used by the woman or put up for adop-
tive implantation, the prior consent agreement is useless because the
objecting party's constitutional right to avoid procreation becomes
creative liberty by reserving to the progenitors the authority to make what is in the first
instance a quintessentially personal, private decision.").
183. See supra note 74 and accompanying text (recognizing one couple's intent, as evi-
denced by their signed consent document, to donate any unused frozen embryos to their
clinic for biological research in the event of changed conditions).
184. Cf. Hecht v. Superior Court, 59 Cal. Rptr. 2d 222, 227 (Ct. App. 1996). The court
in Hecht held that decedent's widow was entitled to possession of her husband's cryopre-
served sperm in accordance with his written intent because he indicated in the sperm bank
donation form, his will, and in a letter to his children, his desire to allow her to attempt a
pregnancy after his death if she desired to do so. See id.
185. See Kass, 696 N.E.2d at 180 (encouraging parties to give serious thought to the
possible contingencies that surround the IVF procedure and to procure explicit agree-
ments in an effort to dispense with the necessity of costly litigation); see also Custody
Questions, supra note 25, at A10 (advocating that states follow New Jersey's lead in pro-
posing legislation that requires all IVF participants, prior to participation, to sign a direc-
tive similar to a living will that would indicate their preferences for disposition in the event
of death, divorce, separation, or abandonment). New Jersey Assemblyman, Neil M.
Cohen, finds that this legislation "would eliminate the emotional and legal problems of
judges having to make [these] decisions." Id.; Davidoff, supra note 20, at 136-37 (recog-
nizing the emotional vulnerability of IVF patients due to participation in the procedure
itself as well as feelings of loss, alienation, and anger due to their infertility).
186. See LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 9:129 (West 1991) (preventing the intentional de-
struction of IVF embryos); supra Part I.B. (suggesting that the right not to procreate is
more significant than the constitutional right to procreate).
187. See LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 9:129 (prohibiting the destruction of human em-
bryos); cf. Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 877 (1992) (recognizing that state
regulations that discourage abortion are permitted, but may not present "a substantial ob-
stacle" to the woman's right to choose).
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paramount to the other donor's interest in procreating.'8 Thus, the util-
ity of IVF consent agreements lies in whether they conform to state law
and/or constitutional principles. 89
A. States Preclude Contractual Enforcement of Prior Consent
Agreements When Disposition Is Prohibited
Legally, the benefit to consent agreements lies in their practical appli-
cation. ' 9° In determining the validity of prior consent documents, courts
apply the same principles that apply to any contract.' 9' As a result,
agreements that violate public policy preclude contractual enforce-
ment.'9' Similarly, consent agreements may also be unenforceable by
reason of mistake, 93 misrepresentation, 94 or significantly changed condi-
tions.195 The analysis of the consent agreement in Kass emphasized the
importance of examining the document in its entirety to discern the
agreement's plain meaning and purpose.' 96 Ultimately, the court in Kass
determined that the agreement clearly articulated the parties' intentions;
thus, the court found the agreement to be a valid means of determining
the parties' intent at the time of their participation in the IVF proce-
dure. 97
188. See supra Part I.B (suggesting that the right not to procreate is more significant
than the constitutional right to procreate); cf. AZ v. BZ, Mass. Law. Wkly. No. 15-008-96,
at 8-11, 23-24 (Mass. Prob. & Fam. Ct., Suffolk County, Mar. 25, 1996) (negating the exis-
tence of seven prior consent documents that explicitly mandated that the woman receive
any remaining frozen embryos for implantation, by applying a contract law analysis to the
couple's "change in circumstances").
189. But see Amercian Fertility Society's June 1990 Report, supra note 62, at 5S (sug-
gesting that the constitutional liberty interest in procreation prohibits state interference
with procreational decisions among consenting adults because different viewpoints re-
garding morality, religion, or symbolism are not enough to justify infringement on funda-
mental rights).
190. See Kass, 696 N.E.2d at 180 (noting the value of signed consent to "minimize mis-
understandings and maximize procreative liberty").
191. See id. (noting that the subject matter of disputes over frozen embryos is new, but
that the "principles governing contract interpretation are not" and that "[w]hether an
agreement is ambiguous is a question of law for the courts" to decide).
192. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS §§ 178, 181 (1981) (outlining un-
enforceable provisions on public policy grounds).
193. See id. §§ 152-53 (explaining when a mistake makes a contract voidable).
194. See id. § 163 (describing when misrepresentation prevents contract formation).
195. See id. §§ 261,265 (addressing discharge by impracticability and/or frustration).
196. See Kass, 696 N.E.2d at 180-81 (illustrating that contract interpretation requires
that substance prevail over form; therefore, a "sensible" construction of the words is nec-
essary to illuminate the "plain purpose" of the agreement).
197. See id. at 180-82. The appellant argued that the prior agreement was ambiguous.
See id. at 180. Specifically, she argued that one of the sentences in the document awarded
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The aim of informed consent agreements is to dispense with the need
for courts to intervene and attempt haphazardly to balance the interests
of the competing parties.'9 Therefore, there are many advantages to
legislation that requires donors, prior to IVF participation, to consider
the options cryopreservation presents. '99 For example, New Hampshire's
requirements of counseling and judicial preauthorization of consent
documents are provisions that other states should emulate when formu-
lating and adopting their own IVF legislation, because it mandates this
pre-agreement reflection.2 ° In New Hampshire, state law requires IVF
donors to consider the profound implications of parenthood before they
full authority to the courts to decide disposition in the event of disagreement. See id. at
181. The sentence in question provided that "[i]n the event of divorce, we understand that
legal ownership of any stored [embryos] must be determined in a property settlement and
will be released as directed by order of a court of competent jurisdiction." Id. The court
determined that appellant's reading of this sentence explicitly ignored the words providing
that ownership "must be determined in a property settlement." Id. The appellate court
had concluded that the sentence, read in the context of the entire agreement, was not in-
tended to provide a court with sole dispositional authority. See id. at 181-82. Further, the
lower court had determined that the sentence was a protective measure designed to insu-
late the IVF program from liability in the event of disagreement between the parties. See
id. at 182. Thus, the court of appeals affirmed the appellate division's interpretation that
the sentence plainly manifested the parties' intent that only a joint decision would allow
implantation of the frozen embryos. See id.
198. See Custody Questions, supra note 25, at A10 (describing proposed legislation
that would eliminate the courts' investment in these matters); see also Davis v. Davis, 842
S.W.2d 588, 590, 603-04 (Tenn. 1992) (balancing the respective interests of the parties due
to the absence of a prior agreement).
199. Cf. Kass, 696 N.E.2d at 180 (noting that written agreements are beneficial be-
cause they provide certainty to the IVF programs that utilize them). For examples of
states that have proposed legislation recently regarding prior consent agreements, see S.
451, 144th Gen. Ass. (Ga. 1998), available in WESTLAW, GA-BILLS Database (provid-
ing that gestational surrogacy contracts are necessary before employing assisted reproduc-
tive technology techniques and that under the terms of the contract, the parents must
agree to assume full parental rights and responsibilities for any resulting children); H.R.
481, 90th Gen. Ass. (I11. 997), available in WESTLAW, IL-BILLS Database (requiring
the written consent of the donors before using or implanting any sperm, ova, or embryos);
H.R. 2863, 181st Gen. Ct. (Mass. 1997), available in WESTLAW, MA-BILLS Database
(providing that fertility clinics must supply patients with information regarding counseling
and support services and all appropriate medical and non-medical alternatives with re-
spect to their proposed treatment, and that they must obtain written consent from the do-
nors before their participation); A.B. 1932, 222d Ann. Leg. Sess. (N.Y. 1999), available in
WESTLAW, NY-BILLS Database (requiring couples or individuals to sign advance writ-
ten directives for the disposition of frozen embryos before participating in IVF).
200. See N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 168-B:13 (1994) (requiring counseling, written certi-
fication of the counseling, and the health care provider's evaluation that the person par-
ticipating in the IVF procedure is qualified); see also id. § 168-B:21 (requiring that the par-
ties to a surrogacy contract petition the court jointly for judicial preauthorization of their
surrogacy arrangement).
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are able to participate.20 ' Thus, a legislative procedure that requires par-
ticipants to be informed of the potential issues surrounding IVF provides
donors with the information to make educated decisions concerning how
to dispose of their embryos in the event of unforeseen circumstances.'O
Education regarding issues that may arise in the context of IVF in-
cludes whether state law will preclude the parties from contractually pro-
viding for their futures. 23 For example, Louisiana law prohibits embryo
destruction; therefore, donors who wish to prevent implantation in the
event of disagreement may not be able to do so contractually because
this result is statutorily prohibited.2°  Maintaining that frozen embryos
have the same statutory rights accorded persons, and considering em-
bryo disposal akin to murder,' 6 presumably, in Louisiana, a contract pro-
viding for destruction in the event of death, divorce, or an unforeseen
circumstance is unenforceable.2 7 Louisiana's statute that affords an em-
bryo the same rights as a living person implies that the interests of the
embryos likely would be considered equally with the interests of the do-
nors of the genetic material.200 The idea of affording embryos equal re-
spect to human beings contradicts sharply with caselaw from other states,
which maintains that the progenitors' interests are paramount in deciding
inquiries regarding ownership.2 9
201. See id. § 168-B:13 (requiring potential parents to indicate in writing their accep-
tance of the legal rights and responsibilities associated with parenthood prior to their par-
ticipation in the IVF procedure); see also id. § 168-B:8 (stating that noncompliance with
respect to New Hampshire's surrogacy requirements allows a court to impose support ob-
ligations upon the parent(s)).
202. See Robert J. Araujo, S.J., Abortion, Ethics, and the Common Good: Who Are
We? What Do We Want? How Do We Get There?, 76 MARQ. L. REV. 701, 712 (1993)
(noting the importance of an individual's informed consent regarding medical and health
care decisions); see also supra notes 199-201 and accompanying text (discussing the bene-
fits of such legislation).
203. See LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 9:129 (West 1991) (prohibiting embryo destruction).
204. See id.; see also Stephens, supra note 26, at 268-69 (discussing the possibility that
IVF participants who reside in Louisiana will "clinic shop" outside of the state due to the
"unfairness" of Louisiana's law prohibiting intentional destruction of fertilized embryos).
205. See LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 9:126 (stating that embryos are "biological human
being[s]").
206. Cf. id. § 9:129 (stating embryos shall not be intentionally destoyed).
207. Cf. id.
208. See id. §§ 9:121, 9:123-125, 9:129.
209. Compare id. § 9:129 (recognizing that human embryos have certain rights granted
by law and cannot be intentionally destroyed), with Kass v. Kass, 696 N.E.2d 174, 182
(N.Y. 1998) (ordering donation of the embryos for research purposes based upon the in-
terests of the commissioning couple as expressed in their prior agreement), and Davis v.
Davis, 842 S.W.2d 588, 604 (Tenn. 1992) (ordering disposal of the embryos after balancing
the interests of the parties).
1999]
Catholic University Law Review
When destruction is prohibited statutorily,210 or when disposition is al-
lowed only by joint decision of the parties,2" embryos can remain indefi-
212nitely in the cryopreserved state. This result, in states that require a
joint decision for disposition, deprives other infertile couples access to
unwanted frozen embryos for purposes of adoptive implantation. In
addition, society is deprived of the potential benefits of embryological
research that can lead to better IVF techniques as well as possible cures
for fatal diseases and congenital birth defects.1 To counteract this re-
sult, states must keep pace with science 21 by developing legislation thathonors the parties' reproductive intent.216
B. Constitutional Rights Also Preclude Contractual Enforcement of Prior
Agreements
The moral and ethical dilemmas collaborative reproduction presents217
210. See, e.g., LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 9:129 (prohibiting intentional destruction of
human ovum).
211. See, e.g., FLA. STAT. ANN. § 742.17 (West 1997) (providing that the couple's writ-
ten agreement controls disposition of their embryos, but that in the absence of a written
agreement the commissioning couple must jointly decide the disposition).
212. See Gina Kolata, Medicine's Troubling Bonus: Surplus of Human Embryos, N.Y.
TIMES, Mar. 16, 1997, at Al (stating that tens of thousands of embryos are accumulating in
liquid nitrogen tanks nationwide as a result of the recent success of IVF).
213. Cf. Carrie Dowling, Vatican Suggests 'Adoption' of Frozen Embryos, USA
TODAY, July 24, 1996, at 1A (suggesting that embryos be released for adoption rather
than destroyed).
214. Cf. June Coleman, Comment, Playing God or Playing Scientist. A Constitutional
Analysis of State Laws Banning Embryological Procedures, 27 PAC. L.J. 1331, 1333-34
(1996) (highlighting the benefits of embryological research).
215. See Kass v. Kass, 696 N.E.2d 174, 178 (N.Y. 1998) (stating that "[als science races
ahead, it leaves in its trail mind-numbing ethical and legal questions") (citing JOHN A.
ROBERTSON, CHILDREN OF CHOICE: FREEDOM AND THE NEW REPRODUCTIVE
TECHNOLOGIES (1994)); see also Custody Questions, supra note 25, at A10 (recognizing
the need to determine who controls individual rights to reproduction with cloning on the
horizon); Sharon Begley, From Human Embryos, Hope for 'Spare Parts', NEWSWEEK,
Nov. 16, 1998, at 73 (recognizing a "[w]orld of [p]ossibilities" for research on cells devel-
oped from human embryos).
216. Cf. Johnson v. Calvert, 851 P.2d 776, 782-84 (Cal. 1993) (interpreting legislation
and finding that an intent-based or contractual analysis should be used to establish parent-
age in the context of surrogacy arrangements).
217. See Siegel, supra note 4, at 43 (suggesting that the legal and ethical side effects of
new "miracle" technologies create a "dark side to science"); see also Davidoff, supra note
20, at 131 (stating that the American legal system has been struggling with the legal and
ethical questions posed by IVF since the first IVF baby was born in the United States in
1981) (citing David G. Dickman, Comment, Social Values in a Brave New World: Toward
a Public Policy Regarding Embryo Status and In Vitro Fertilization, 29 ST. Louis U. L.J.
817 (1985)). But see Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 850-51 (1992) (noting
that the Court's obligation is not to mandate a moral code regarding abortion, but to ex-
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force the courts to dispense with an inferred commitment from the do-
nors to initiate a pregnancy." 8 Similarly, prior agreements that award the
embryos to a donor who wishes to give the entities a chance at survival
may be unenforceable due to the other party's constitutional right to
219
avoid procreation. In matters of reproductive choice, protection
against unwanted procreation is the predominate concern. 220 Thus, the
constitutional right of all individuals to refrain from procreation may ne-
gate the rule promulgated in Kass, and suggested by the court in Davis,
that a prior consent agreement is always binding on the parties if the
agreement expressly allows the woman who paid for the IVF procedure
or a willing donee to implant any leftover embryos.22 ' The overriding
amine the constitutional issue regarding whether a state can regulate a woman's decision
to have an abortion).
218. See Davis v. Davis, 842 S.W.2d 588, 591 (Tenn. 1992) (rejecting an inference
"from the parties' participation in the creation of the embryos that they had made an ir-
revocable commitment to reproduction"); cf. Casey, 505 U.S. at 853 (noting that one view
is that every pregnancy ought to be carried to term no matter how difficult; the other view
is that a parent's anguish over an inability to provide for an infant is a cruelty that should
be avoided). But see Puskar, supra note 10, at 776-77 (articulating the Catholic Church's
position that the embryos are children and must be treated with the full respect afforded
persons).
219. See supra Part I.B (discussing state court decisions that have trumped an individ-
ual's right to procreate with the other party's right not to procreate); cf AZ v. BZ, Mass.
Law. Wkly. No. 15-008-96, at 23 (Mass. Prob. & Fam. Ct., Suffolk County, Mar. 25, 1996)
(overriding a prior consent document by applying the principles of contract law).
220. See Davis, 842 S.W.2d at 603-04 (awarding the embryos to the party who objected
to becoming a parent in part because the party was "vehemently opposed to fathering a
child that would not live with both parents" due to his own experiences as a child growing
up without his own father). The court's decision acknowledged that parenthood forced
upon a man who no longer desired a child would financially and emotionally burden him
against his will. See id.; AZ v. BZ, Mass. Law. Wkly. 15-008-96, at 23-25 (prohibiting em-
bryo implantation, despite the couple's prior agreement to award them to the wife in the
event of disagreement, separation, death, or menopause).
221. The rule promulgated in Kass and suggested by the court in Davis was that prior
consent documents are valid and enforceable. See Kass v. Kass, 696 N.E.2d 174, 180 (N.Y.
1998); Davis, 842 S.W.2d at 604. Both courts, however, also noted that the first step in re-
solving frozen embryo ownership disputes is to look to the preferences of the participants.
See Kass, 696 N.E.2d at 180; Davis, 842 S.W.2d at 604. Neither case addressed whether a
prior agreement still controls if it specifies implantation over disposition and one party
later objects, but this was the issue in the case of AZ v. BZ, Mass. Law. Wkly. No. 15-008-
96, at 8-11, 14-16. In AZ v. BZ, the court noted that judicial authorization to use the em-
bryos for the purpose of achieving a pregnancy may result in a child (or children) that
would be unwanted by the husband, even though he initially agreed to this result when he
consented to the IVF procedure). See id. at 16. The judge applied the principles of con-
tract law to the dispute and determined that the couples' lives were so drastically different
from the time that they executed the IVF directive seven years earlier-in the sense that
the couple had twins as a result of a previous implantation, the wife filed a restraining or-
der against the husband, and the husband filed for divorce-that they could not possibly
have foreseen their present situation. See id. at 22-25. The judge ruled that the couple's
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constitutional and inherent social concerns of unwanted parenthood in-
stead may force state courts to choose disposition, even when a jointly
signed prior agreement expressly mandates the use of the remaining fro-
zen embryos for procreational purposes.222
The technique of cryopreservation extends the viability of fertilized
21embryos for an indefinite period of time. Consequently, participating
parties may wish to plan for their futures by way of prior informed con-
sent documents.2 It is relevant in considering this issue of whether con-
stitutional rights should override contractual intent, however, to analyze
the reproductive differences between men and women.22 1 It is often
overlooked that a woman's supply of eggs is limited, and that a woman's
fertility declines over time, whereas men can produce sperm throughout
their adult lives.26 As a consequence, older women who divorce are
more likely to face a declining possibility of becoming a parent if they are
not allowed access to their frozen embryos, whereas a man remains fer-
change in circumstances rendered their prior seven agreements invalid. See id. at 25. But
see Hecht v. Superior Court, 59 Cal. Rptr. 2d 222, 227-28 (Ct. App. 1996) (upholding a
prior agreement that specified that a woman be given the chance to implant her late hus-
band's sperm by artificial insemination). In Hecht, the decedent's adult children were
adamantly opposed to the court's decision to release their father's sperm to their step-
mother, even though these were his explicit instructions. See id. at 226-28. The court held
that the children were not parties to the donation procedure; therefore, their interests
were not paramount to their father's right to procreate. See id.
222. See supra note 220 and accompanying text.
223. See Kass, 696 N.E.2d at 178, 180 (citing the New York State Task Force on Life
and the Law, Assisted Reproductive Technologies: Analysis and Recommendations for
Public Policy, at 289 (Apr. 1998)) (maintaining that tens of thousands of frozen embryos
are stored annually in liquid nitrogen canisters, some having been in that state for more
than ten years without any instructions for their use or disposal and also declaring that the
benefit of cryopreservation-that viability of embryos can be extended indefinitely-is
also a detriment because it "allows time for minds, and circumstances, to change"). In
England, a large number of frozen embryos were recently destroyed due to the fact that
they were being kept in storage with no instructions for their use or disposal. See Puskar,
supra note 10, at 776-77. In response, the Vatican issued its proposal whereby married
women should come forward and carry these unwanted embryos to term. See id.
224. See Kass, 696 N.E.2d at 179-80 (acknowledging the need for "particular care" in
formulating consent documents to adhere to the true interests of the parties).
225. Cf. Elizabeth Heitman, Infertility as a Public Health Problem: Why Assisted Re-
productive Technologies Are Not the Answer, 6 STAN. L. & POL'Y REV. 89, 92 (1995)
(highlighting the fact that a man's reproductive capacity lasts a lifetime, whereas a
woman's reproductive capacity is limited to the time between the onset of menses and
menopause, or roughly between the ages of 15 and 44).
226. See Ruth Colker, Pregnant Men Revisited or Sperm Is Cheap, Eggs Are Not, 47
HASTINGS L.J. 1063, 1063 (1996) (arguing that women have a greater interest in gaining
the right to implant their frozen embryos because sperm are "cheap" and plentiful). But
see Gina Kolata, A Record and Big Questions as Woman Gives Birth at 63, N.Y. TIMES,
Apr. 24, 1997, at Al (reporting that a fertility clinic assisted a 63-year-old woman in giving
birth to a healthy baby).
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tile into his much later years.227 Thus, "allow[ing] the person who does
not wish to become a parent to play the trump card is to exercise an ex-
tremely powerful veto in the life of the other person when there initially
was mutual consent.
22S
It is in the best interests of society, however, to allow one donor the
ability to override the couples' joint contractual intent due to the poten-
tially detrimental effects of parenthood forced upon an unwilling partici-S229
pant. Although the desire to become a parent is an important con-
cern, 23  the strain accompanying unwilling parenthood is arguably
231greater. Even if the embryos are put up for adoption and not used by
one of the donors themselves, the psychological burden still rests upon
the involuntary parent in knowing that a child of his/hers exists some-
232
where. The fact that the parent has no idea with whom or where that
227. See Colker, supra note 226, at 1066 (noting that women are less stable economi-
cally after a divorce than men); see also Heitman, supra note 223, at 95 (approximating the
costs associated with IVF as ranging between $66,667 and $114,286 and recognizing that
these numbers climb to between "$160,000 [and] $800,000 when IVF is used to overcome
the combination of male-factor infertility and advanced maternal age").
228. Colker, supra note 226, at 1069; see also Kass v. Kass, 663 N.Y.S.2d 581, 592
(App. Div. 1997) (stating that "[olnce lost, the right not to procreate can never be re-
gained).
229. See supra note 220 and accompanying text.
230. See Kass, 696 N.E.2d at 175 (explaining that the ex-wife wanted the pre-zygotes
implanted because she felt that this was her last chance to become a mother).
231. See Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 153 (1973) (discussing the detriment imposed
upon a pregnant woman if the state chose to deny her the right to an abortion in the early
stages of pregnancy). The Court noted specifically that forced maternity may impose "a
distressful life and future," invoke psychological harm, and tax the mother's mental and
physical health. Id. The Court also cautioned against the problems of bringing a child into
a home where s/he is unwanted or where the family is unable to provide for its develop-
ment and care. See id. Therefore, the Court suggested that these elements warranted con-
sideration over whether or not to terminate the life of the fetus in the consultation process
between a woman and her physician in the decision. See id.
In the context of IVF, this strain of becoming a parent unwillingly is also a man's con-
cern. See Davis v. Davis, 842 S.W.2d 588, 603-04 (Tenn. 1992). In Davis, the male IVF
participant did not want to become a father after he and his wife divorced because his own
biological father was absent from his childhood and he suffered psychologically as a result.
See id. In balancing the interests of the parties, the Davis court found the husband's ar-
gument persuasive, but noted an exception to its rule-that the party wishing to avoid
parenthood ordinarily should prevail-if this were the woman's last chance at becoming a
parent. See id. at 604.
The female progenitor in Kass articulated this last-chance argument. See Kass, 696
N.E.2d at 175. The court, however, did not find it persuasive and chose instead to rely on
the prior agreement between the parties. See id.
232. See Jennifer L. Carow, Note, Davis v. Davis: An Inconsistent Exception to an Oth-
erwise Sound Rule Advancing Procreational Freedom and Reproductive Technology, 43
DEPAUL L. REV. 523, 566 (1994) (stating "there is no way to end biological ties, and very
few ways to end emotional ones").
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child is living is not important if there are feelings of "guilt, attachment,
or responsibility" associated with the birth of that child. 3
Public policy also seems to indicate that gamete-donors unwilling to
proceed with IVF should not be forced into parenthood because they
may be bound legally to comply with parental responsibilities.234 Some
states impose an unwaivable duty upon biological parents to support
their offspring, regardless of the means of conception.235 Finally, it is im-
portant to consider whether a child brought into existence as a result of a
court-ordered implantation has inheritance rights to a biological parent's
236
estate. Problematic situations such as these further support the propo-
sition that both parties to the IVF procedure should have the opportu-
nity to dispose of the embryos even if this decision runs contrary to prior
contractual intent.237
IV. CONCLUSION
Scientific advancements in reproductive technology have made pro-
creational decision making complicated. Controversy surrounds owner-
ship rights to frozen embryos because unforeseen circumstances may
233. See Robertson, supra note 20, at 479 (stating that "[e]ven if no rearing duties or
even contact result[s], the unconsenting partner will know that biologic offspring exist,
with the powerful attendant reverberations of guilt, attachment, or responsibility which
that knowledge can ignite").
234. Cf. L. Pamela P. v. Frank S., 449 N.E.2d 713, 714, 716 (N.Y. 1983) (imposing a
support obligation upon a father who became a parent unwillingly when the court deter-
mined that the mother's alleged misrepresentation-that she was using contraception-
was irrelevant); see also In re Buzzanca, 72 Cal. Rptr. 2d 280, 282 (Ct. App. 1998) (holding
the husband liable for child support because he initially consented to becoming a parent,
even though the child was conceived after he filed for divorce by a donor egg, donor
sperm, and a surrogate mother); Stephens, supra note 26, at 265 (arguing that the method
of conception should not be a factor in determining the rights of a child).
235. For examples of states that impose parental responsibilities and custody rights
upon artificial insemination donors, see CAL. PENAL CODE § 270 (West 1988) and N.H.
REV. STAT. ANN. § 168-B:8 (1994). But see In re Witbeck-Wildhagen, 667 N.E.2d 122,
125-26 (Ill. App. Ct. 1996) (holding that it would be "unjust" to impose a support obliga-
tion upon a husband who never consented to the artificial insemination procedure).
236. Cf. Barry Renfrew, Future of 2 Embryos Poses New Questions, BOSTON GLOBE,
June 19, 1984, at 1 (questioning the legal status of these embryos, particularly whether
they would be able to inherit from their biological parent's estate); Sally Squires, Whose
Baby Is It, Anyway? Surrogates, Donors and Petri Dishes Are All in the Family, WASH.
POST, April 12, 1988, at z14 (reporting that a court ruled that any children born as a result
of embryo implantation had no legal rights to the biological parents' estate).
237. See generally Davis v. Davis, 842 S.W.2d 588, 601 (Tenn. 1992) (stating that "pro-
creational autonomy is composed of two rights of equal significance-the right to procre-
ate and the right to avoid procreation"); Panitch, supra note 4, at 572-73 (recognizing the
undesirability of requiring double consent; initial consent to begin IVF and continued con-
sent throughout the IVF process).
1026 [Vol. 48:989
Examining Disputes over Ownership Rights
arise while the embryos exist in the cryopreserved state. Matters re-
garding repioductive choice deserve time and care to ensure that the par-
ticipating parties are informed and that their intentions are clearly mani-
fested in contingency agreements. The utility of these agreements,
however, lies in resolving later disputes over whether the parties will be-
come parents. The principles of contract law allow gamete-providers to
stipulate as to their future interests; but, states also have an interest in
protecting potential children from harm associated with forcing parent-
hood upon unwilling participants. This state interest often runs directly
counter to the desire of one party to become a parent and may raise con-
stitutional concerns. New Hampshire's requirement of judicial preau-
thorization of consent agreements is a start to accord IVF documents
more weight, but it remains to be seen whether even judicial recognition
of IVF agreements can withstand a donor's constitutional claim to avoid
unwanted parenthood. As a result, IVF donors must be aware, when
they sign prior consent documents, that their contractual intent may be
superceded by state and/or constitutional law, even if their intentions are
jointly decided and expressed clearly at the time of their participation in
the procedure.
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